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On 4-8-2009 1:46, Darren New wrote:
> andrel wrote:
ps
> If I said "I *know* Lincoln was the first president of the USA", what
> would you say? What if I was absolutely positive? Would you say I knew
> that for a fact? Or would you say "No, your belief is incorrect"?
I think I'd say that you have your facts wrong. That happens quite
often. Sometimes when I give a talk I end with the conclusion that 'what
is common knowledge may not be true'. Specifically of course when I have
just shown an example of that.
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andrel wrote:
> On 4-8-2009 1:46, Darren New wrote:
>> andrel wrote:
>>> What I said (and I think Jim is along the same line) is not that
>>> knowledge is faith but that those that believe *know* that they are
>>> right.
>>
>> Right. Except by making it mean "I'm really *really* faithful", you've
>> eliminated the usefulness of the word.
>
> Again, that is not what I did.
"Those that believe *know* they are right" is incorrect. "Those that believe
think they *know* they are right" is correct.
> The problem with this statement is in 'without justification'. That
> unfortunately is not an objective term and that is where the problem is.
It depends on how good your evidence is, of course. If you believe you were
kidnapped by aliens while your entire family watched you sleeping in front
of the fireplace, then you're without justification for your belief.
If you think you know that George Washington was the first president of the
USA, you're pretty justified in believing that.
As I said, there are grey zones in the middle, of course, where one might
not know if there was sufficient justification.
>> Maybe I'm just a bit oversensitive, with all the people who actually
>> deep-down inside know they are *not* right trying to convince me by
>> overstating their knowledge.
>
> I am overstating, deep down there is no doubt, but I am not trying to
> convince you, so that is not incompatible with your statement
Right.
--
Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
"We'd like you to back-port all the changes in 2.0
back to version 1.0."
"We've done that already. We call it 2.0."
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On 4-8-2009 20:56, Darren New wrote:
> andrel wrote:
>> On 4-8-2009 1:46, Darren New wrote:
>>> andrel wrote:
>>>> What I said (and I think Jim is along the same line) is not that
>>>> knowledge is faith but that those that believe *know* that they are
>>>> right.
>>>
>>> Right. Except by making it mean "I'm really *really* faithful",
>>> you've eliminated the usefulness of the word.
>>
>> Again, that is not what I did.
>
> "Those that believe *know* they are right" is incorrect. "Those that
> believe think they *know* they are right" is correct.
Only from the perspective of an outsider. Knowledge is not objective, I
understand why you would like it to be so, but alas...
>
>> The problem with this statement is in 'without justification'. That
>> unfortunately is not an objective term and that is where the problem is.
>
> It depends on how good your evidence is, of course. If you believe you
> were kidnapped by aliens while your entire family watched you sleeping
> in front of the fireplace, then you're without justification for your
> belief.
Which would not stop some people from knowing they had been abducted,
even if you would insist they mere believe it.
> If you think you know that George Washington was the first president of
> the USA, you're pretty justified in believing that.
There was a trick question about that on QI some tie ago, I forgot the
point, however :(
> As I said, there are grey zones in the middle, of course, where one
> might not know if there was sufficient justification.
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On 4-8-2009 21:10, andrel wrote:
> Only from the perspective of an outsider. Knowledge is not objective, I
> understand why you would like it to be so, but alas...
Isn't there a scene in Goedel Escher Bach where something is proven but
then the focus turns on the proof rules, because they must first be
agreed on. But that requires that you have to agree on how to make rules
proof rules etc.
Which a.o. shows that you don't have to agree on what constitutes a
proof, you can always go to a meta level. That even works for Euclid. I
think it is clear that somewhere on the third meta level we don't agree.
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andrel wrote:
> Only from the perspective of an outsider. Knowledge is not objective, I
> understand why you would like it to be so, but alas...
Well, we're kind of debating over the meaning of the word. What's the
objective word *you* would use for justified true belief?
> Which would not stop some people from knowing they had been abducted,
> even if you would insist they mere believe it.
OK. I'm just objecting to the use of that word to mean that you can know
something which you are justified in believing is false.
--
Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
"We'd like you to back-port all the changes in 2.0
back to version 1.0."
"We've done that already. We call it 2.0."
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andrel wrote:
> Isn't there a scene in Goedel Escher Bach where something is proven but
> then the focus turns on the proof rules, because they must first be
> agreed on.
This always happens when you try to make math tell you something about the
real world. The problem isn't with proving something mathematically. It's
with proving that the math is isomorphic to reality.
--
Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
"We'd like you to back-port all the changes in 2.0
back to version 1.0."
"We've done that already. We call it 2.0."
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On 4-8-2009 23:49, Darren New wrote:
> andrel wrote:
>> Only from the perspective of an outsider. Knowledge is not objective,
>> I understand why you would like it to be so, but alas...
>
> Well, we're kind of debating over the meaning of the word. What's the
> objective word *you* would use for justified true belief?
Depends on who we are talking about. For myself I reserve 'knowledge'
for others 'superstition'. (just like most people)
>> Which would not stop some people from knowing they had been abducted,
>> even if you would insist they mere believe it.
>
> OK. I'm just objecting to the use of that word to mean that you can know
> something which you are justified in believing is false.
I know, and I am arguing that you do so because you have the false
belief that knowledge is objective.
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Jim Henderson wrote:
> On Mon, 03 Aug 2009 11:49:13 -0700, Patrick Elliott wrote:
>
>> Jim Henderson wrote:
>>> On Sun, 02 Aug 2009 22:10:36 -0700, Patrick Elliott wrote:
>>>
>>>> This is basic child development stuff, sheesh..
>>> Well, you may have a background in child development. I don't.
>>> Sheesh.
>>>
>>> Jim
>> Actually, no I don't, but I read **a lot**, especially since, starting
>> some 20 years ago, I had a fascination with AI, and the logical means to
>> learn about why it didn't work well, once I found that, is to learn how
>> the mind worked. My discovery was, sadly, that real brains don't work
>> much better, they just have a more robust system of, "fill in the blanks
>> and hope it works".
>
> My point stands, you've read more about it than I do. So your expressed
> "disdain" for what I said that you said was "basic child development
> stuff" really was misplaced, which kinda was my point.
>
> Jim
Hmm. Point taken. But, then, I also tend to forget that not everyone
necessarily took even the basic psychology course I did in college
either, which covered at least bits of it too. Still, its harder to miss
some of the common examples of mind tricks, which have been shown on TV
programs. But, again, that only works if you presume they where watching
the show on "Funny tricks played on people using psychology.", instead
of, "Random sitcom #345, in which someone trips over a hose.", that day
instead. lol Or, well... you get what I mean. Picking things with,
relatively, *zero* content in new ideas, or which tend to feed into
common perception, or not watching at all, instead of pointing out where
those perceptions fail, etc.
I suppose... Its sort of similar to the reaction that someone who has
gone to church every day for 20 years (but probably never read the Bible
on their own from cover to cover, in my, and other's experience),
wondering how I don't **get** how all the "truths" they know are valid.
But, its not *quite* the same thing, since, imho, they are the people
standing, like the natives in one of the other posts, looking out at a
field and going, "How did you make cows the size of flies?" I definitely
need to remember that one.
--
void main () {
If Schrödingers_cat is alive or version > 98 {
if version = "Vista" {
call slow_by_half();
call DRM_everything();
}
call functional_code();
}
else
call crash_windows();
}
<A HREF='http://www.daz3d.com/index.php?refid=16130551'>Get 3D Models,
3D Content, and 3D Software at DAZ3D!</A>
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andrel wrote:
> Depends on who we are talking about. For myself I reserve 'knowledge'
> for others 'superstition'. (just like most people)
I can't parse that sentence.
> I know, and I am arguing that you do so because you have the false
> belief that knowledge is objective.
I never claimed it was objective. Indeed, I asserted the opposite.
--
Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
"We'd like you to back-port all the changes in 2.0
back to version 1.0."
"We've done that already. We call it 2.0."
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Jim Henderson wrote:
> On Mon, 03 Aug 2009 12:10:24 -0700, Patrick Elliott wrote:
>
>> Jim Henderson wrote:
>>> On Sun, 02 Aug 2009 21:54:23 -0700, Patrick Elliott wrote:
>>>
>>>> Instinctive certainties, however, are wrong more than half the time.
>>> Citation?
>>>
>> Uh.. Such numbers are also made up and wrong, more than half the time?
>> lol
>
> It is true that 78.64% (I'm rounding) of all statistics are made up on
> the spot. :-)
>
>> Seriously though, I don't know the actual number, or have a cite, but I
>> *have* seen cases dealing with cognition, where you can not only get
>> 50-50 fails, but even 99% failures. One of the best examples is the,
>> "two people with a big sign walking rudely between two people talking.",
>> experiment they run, yearly, at some colleges, for their psychology
>> experiments. The one where they replace the person asking the question
>> of some random person with someone the wrong height, dressed wrong, in
>> clothing some **totally** different color, or even the wrong gender, and
>> like 90% of the people being "asked", never notice the substitution. The
>> brain just starts over where it was interrupted, so long as the
>> conversation "seems" to be the same, and ignore **everything** else. The
>> replacement could probably be standing their nude and the only reaction
>> you would get was, "Damn, I didn't realize when you came up that you
>> where nude.", not, "Where the hell did the original person I was talking
>> to go?"
>>
>> The ease by which the mind can be tricked is actually quite scary.
>
> True, but at the same time, some people have *very* good instincts. I
> seem to be one of those kinds of people - because I have an instinct that
> something's going to be OK or work out for the best, and I find that
> better than 90% of the time, I'm right. That's far better than the luck
> of averages.
>
Actually. No. There are two problems with this. One is called
"confirmation bias". The mind, as a means of helping itself *make* such
good choices, de-emphasizes bad ones, while exaggerating perceived good
ones. The result is that we tend to forget the bad things. Someone gave
and example of this about why we tend to, in old age, think the past was
better than now. The way they put it is, "50% of everything ever made is
useless crap, whether it be music, literature, or anything else. Much of
the good stuff is kept, some of the bad stuff survives, but, overall, we
only ever actually remember the good bits, so the past always **seems**
to contain fewer problems, better ideas, better things, etc. than now."
Or, something roughly to that effect.
Everyone thinks that they make good instinctive decisions 90% of the
time, save for those people that are totally disfunctional and hide in
their houses, unwilling to make *any* decisions. Its our nature to
forget the cases where we screwed up, or at least marginalize them, in
favor of a self perception of being right most of the time. We couldn't
function effectively if we second guessed every action, based on a
recognition that we get it close enough to right only half the time to
call it "good instinct".
Its also a tested psychological factor that the true twits in society
have a coping mechanism, by which they "exaggerate" their own competence.
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2000/01/18/MN73840.DTL
By the same token, people *good at their jobs*, tend to know that they
could be wrong, are prone to mistakes, and can get to be hyper critical
of their own successes. What would appear to be "pride" or "humility" in
people with high positions could very well be signs of instead
"incompetence" and "great skill", in the same order. Left me struggling
with an infinite loop though, "are the things I am bad at, things I am
actually pretty good at, but I didn't see it, because I am too critical,
or am I instead horrible at the things I think I am good at, and still
as bad at the ones I think I am, as I believe." lol
> I've also been told by people in professions that depend on the ability
> to read people and situations that my instincts are exceptionally good -
> I have an extremely good track record and picking out attempts at
> deception. Part of that I attribute to the fact that I tend not to trust
> very easily because I know that people will generally try to get away
> with whatever they can.
>
> Jim
I would, with some caveats, tend to allow for their perceptions to be
less flawed than yours. The caveats being, for starters, that their
perception of "why" you seem to have good instincts may be due to their
own flawed views of who a good candidate for deception are, and the
like, due to personal bias, than to actual skill in the matter. Good
example of this sort of fun thing:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8183502.stm
Now, if everyone that was telling you that you are good at detecting
deceit where one of those who claimed to trust priests, farmers and
prostitutes, before scientists, what would your reaction be to their
certainty of how good you are?
Point being, pretty much by definition, any social group you are in is
**already** predisposed, by you as a member, to perceive your
contribution as more trustworthy than someone else's. Its the whole my
tribe/monkey-troop is more worthy than those other monkeys, thing. ;)
--
void main () {
If Schrödingers_cat is alive or version > 98 {
if version = "Vista" {
call slow_by_half();
call DRM_everything();
}
call functional_code();
}
else
call crash_windows();
}
<A HREF='http://www.daz3d.com/index.php?refid=16130551'>Get 3D Models,
3D Content, and 3D Software at DAZ3D!</A>
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