On Fri, 07 Aug 2009 22:52:05 -0700, Patrick Elliott wrote:

> Jim Henderson wrote:
>>> Now, if everyone that was telling you that you are good at detecting
>>> deceit where one of those who claimed to trust priests, farmers and
>>> prostitutes, before scientists, what would your reaction be to their
>>> certainty of how good you are?
>> 
>> Admittedly not that good.  That's why I don't look to those kinds of
>> people (or people actually in those professions) to help me adjust my
>> personal self-perception bias.
>> 
>> Jim
> 
> Well, my point here was that "everyone" has some general biases. Its not
> hard to detect "some" kinds of deceit, especially if they manage to
> press many of the wrong buttons. After all, its likely that the
> individual you are talking about where used to dealing with precisely
> the people that thought they where going to, i.e. lawyers. They knew
> their mind set, they knew what to say that would sound plausible to
> "those" people, etc. You on the other hand... they where not able to
> predict, so couldn't, as effectively, mess with. So, yes, in that
> situation "anyone" with your background might have had "better"
> instincts than the people who they where "intending" to target.

Perhaps, but the specific case in hand the person wasn't intending to be 
talking to the lawyer at all.  He was trying to force me to do something/
allow him to do something.  He said the magic words that meant I had to 
take it to legal, though - and he was *very* surprised when he got a call 
from a lawyer.  He was trying to deceive me, but didn't know me very 
well.  His thinking was "Jim should value me and my contribution, so I 
should be able to force him to bend to my will".  When I didn't, he 
started trying to use deceit, even dragging others into his deception 
(which could have gotten really ugly).

> This is actually so common that there are a few companies that have
> started, based on the theory, "Everyone has blind spots." The idea being
> that an engineer, for example, may be clearly aware of some math,
> design, behavior, or curiosity of the things they work on, which a
> biologist simply doesn't know. Yet, that thing "may" provide a lead
> into, or explanation for, some biological issue, for which a purely
> bio-based examination fails to come up with. Mind, this is kind of like
> someone failing to realize that triangles are applicable to house
> building, as well as bridge building, but its still a blind spot.
> Laywers, also have blind spots. And, my guess is, who ever your working
> with, do, and they just happen to not match yours. ;)

One of the things I've read is that every company's marketing department 
needs someone with a sick sense of humour.  Reason being that when 
product naming/marketing plans/marketing campaigns are created, you need 
that person to make sure you're not being blind to some sort of rude word 
in your marketing that isn't intended.  Like an abbreviation that almost 
spells a curse word.

Jim

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My degree required a number of classes in various fields, and after
taking all of them, I still had to take some more credits to fill it
up reaching a minimum of 124. But, to my surprise, the credits could
be any field other than my own major. Anyway, later on, I applied for
another degree in another school who then told me: ``you didn't take
too many credits in your field.''

Define frustration.

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andrel wrote:
> On 7-8-2009 1:25, Darren New wrote:
>> andrel wrote:
>>> Because that is what everybody does, even you.
>>
>> Yes. That doesn't mean it *is* knowledge, and that doesn't mean 
>> everything is reasonably "knowledge" to someone. That's why I'm 
>> bringing up the examples of Napoleon.
> 
> Let me put it this way: I say I *'know'* something if it is beyond 
> reasonable doubt for *me*. Beyong reasonable doubt can be for a number 
> of reasons:
> 1) based on authority that I have no reason to doubt (the sun is about 
> 150 million kilometers away)
> 2) own experience (there must be an algorithm that computes the cube of 
> an integer finalizing 3 bits per iteration*)
> 3) when the negation would be incompatible with my existence (god does 
> not exist)
> Possibly an underlying problem in this discussion is that you assumed 
> that the non existence of god is category 1 or 2 knowledge (because it 
> would be for you?) whereas it is actually category 3. Also possibly 
> confusing is that I admit that for theists the negation may also be 
> category 3. I don't see a problem in that because we are different people.
> 
body else, has never seen.

And yet.. You miss category 4: "Because the negation would contradict 
societal ideas and social beliefs, which I am heavily invested in." One 
**strongly** suspects that the same argument of negation in #3 would be 
stated by *anyone* with *any* god, even one so terrifyingly different 
from yours that you find its very nature abhorrent. In fact, I am 
certain of it. Its the Francis Collins method of "knowing". And, its 
been rightly dissected by numerous people, ever since it was suggested 
he might become the head of the NIH. This is one of the better ones:

http://www.reasonproject.org/archive/item/the_strange_case_of_francis_collins2/

I am sure it wouldn't be *too hard* to think of other things, besides 
religion, which are entirely social constructs of their society, are 
presumed to be "known" as fact, and yet are absolutely nothing of the sort.


-- 
void main () {
   If Schrödingers_cat is alive or version > 98 {
     if version = "Vista" {
       call slow_by_half();
       call DRM_everything();
     }
     call functional_code();
   }
   else
     call crash_windows();
}

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3D Content, and 3D Software at DAZ3D!</A>

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Jim Henderson wrote:
> On Fri, 07 Aug 2009 22:52:05 -0700, Patrick Elliott wrote:
> 
>> Jim Henderson wrote:
>>>> Now, if everyone that was telling you that you are good at detecting
>>>> deceit where one of those who claimed to trust priests, farmers and
>>>> prostitutes, before scientists, what would your reaction be to their
>>>> certainty of how good you are?
>>> Admittedly not that good.  That's why I don't look to those kinds of
>>> people (or people actually in those professions) to help me adjust my
>>> personal self-perception bias.
>>>
>>> Jim
>> Well, my point here was that "everyone" has some general biases. Its not
>> hard to detect "some" kinds of deceit, especially if they manage to
>> press many of the wrong buttons. After all, its likely that the
>> individual you are talking about where used to dealing with precisely
>> the people that thought they where going to, i.e. lawyers. They knew
>> their mind set, they knew what to say that would sound plausible to
>> "those" people, etc. You on the other hand... they where not able to
>> predict, so couldn't, as effectively, mess with. So, yes, in that
>> situation "anyone" with your background might have had "better"
>> instincts than the people who they where "intending" to target.
> 
> Perhaps, but the specific case in hand the person wasn't intending to be 
> talking to the lawyer at all.  He was trying to force me to do something/
> allow him to do something.  He said the magic words that meant I had to 
> take it to legal, though - and he was *very* surprised when he got a call 
> from a lawyer.  He was trying to deceive me, but didn't know me very 
> well.  His thinking was "Jim should value me and my contribution, so I 
> should be able to force him to bend to my will".  When I didn't, he 
> started trying to use deceit, even dragging others into his deception 
> (which could have gotten really ugly).
> 
And, I am sure it worked before, on people more gullible. Most people, 
whether they have suspicions or not, will cave under such tactics, 
either due to being unaware how far they could take it, or because they 
don't want to put in the effort to fight back.

-- 
void main () {
   If Schrödingers_cat is alive or version > 98 {
     if version = "Vista" {
       call slow_by_half();
       call DRM_everything();
     }
     call functional_code();
   }
   else
     call crash_windows();
}

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3D Content, and 3D Software at DAZ3D!</A>

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On Sat, 08 Aug 2009 22:51:38 -0700, Patrick Elliott wrote:

> And, I am sure it worked before, on people more gullible. 

I'm sure it had.  One of the people who was convinced to pass along 
untrue information clearly had given in on the issue.

> Most people,
> whether they have suspicions or not, will cave under such tactics,
> either due to being unaware how far they could take it, or because they
> don't want to put in the effort to fight back.

It becomes a question of the value of the thing that's being defended vs. 
the cost of fighting the deception.  I made the judgment that the value 
of the thing being defended was higher than the cost of giving in 
(because giving in would mean others could get away with it and devalue 
the thing being defended).

Jim

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On 9-8-2009 7:47, Patrick Elliott wrote:
> andrel wrote:
>> On 7-8-2009 1:25, Darren New wrote:
>>> andrel wrote:
>>>> Because that is what everybody does, even you.
>>>
>>> Yes. That doesn't mean it *is* knowledge, and that doesn't mean 
>>> everything is reasonably "knowledge" to someone. That's why I'm 
>>> bringing up the examples of Napoleon.
>>
>> Let me put it this way: I say I *'know'* something if it is beyond 
>> reasonable doubt for *me*. Beyong reasonable doubt can be for a number 
>> of reasons:
>> 1) based on authority that I have no reason to doubt (the sun is about 
>> 150 million kilometers away)
>> 2) own experience (there must be an algorithm that computes the cube 
>> of an integer finalizing 3 bits per iteration*)
>> 3) when the negation would be incompatible with my existence (god does 
>> not exist)
>> Possibly an underlying problem in this discussion is that you assumed 
>> that the non existence of god is category 1 or 2 knowledge (because it 
>> would be for you?) whereas it is actually category 3. Also possibly 
>> confusing is that I admit that for theists the negation may also be 
>> category 3. I don't see a problem in that because we are different 
>> people.
>>
> body else, has never seen.
> 
> And yet.. You miss category 4: "Because the negation would contradict 
> societal ideas and social beliefs, which I am heavily invested in." 

I don't see the difference with my category 3. Then again I have 
sometimes difficulty to understand what you exactly mean.

> One 
> **strongly** suspects that the same argument of negation in #3 would be 
> stated by *anyone* with *any* god, even one so terrifyingly different 
> from yours that you find its very nature abhorrent. 

Yes indeed. I tried to word it in such a way that it was clear that I 
intended to include those.

> In fact, I am 
> certain of it. Its the Francis Collins method of "knowing". And, its 
> been rightly dissected by numerous people, ever since it was suggested 
> he might become the head of the NIH. This is one of the better ones:
> 
> http://www.reasonproject.org/archive/item/the_strange_case_of_francis_collins2/ 

I hadn't heard of that. Thanks for the link.

> I am sure it wouldn't be *too hard* to think of other things, besides 
> religion, which are entirely social constructs of their society, are 
> presumed to be "known" as fact, and yet are absolutely nothing of the sort.

As I am an atheist, many people would consider anything I say outside of 
religion. Other fields include male/female and class differences and the 
idea that if anybody be as selfish as possible the whole world would be 
better.

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andrel wrote:
> On 9-8-2009 7:47, Patrick Elliott wrote:
>> andrel wrote:
>>> On 7-8-2009 1:25, Darren New wrote:
>>>> andrel wrote:
>>>>> Because that is what everybody does, even you.
>>>>
>>>> Yes. That doesn't mean it *is* knowledge, and that doesn't mean 
>>>> everything is reasonably "knowledge" to someone. That's why I'm 
>>>> bringing up the examples of Napoleon.
>>>
>>> Let me put it this way: I say I *'know'* something if it is beyond 
>>> reasonable doubt for *me*. Beyong reasonable doubt can be for a 
>>> number of reasons:
>>> 1) based on authority that I have no reason to doubt (the sun is 
>>> about 150 million kilometers away)
>>> 2) own experience (there must be an algorithm that computes the cube 
>>> of an integer finalizing 3 bits per iteration*)
>>> 3) when the negation would be incompatible with my existence (god 
>>> does not exist)
>>> Possibly an underlying problem in this discussion is that you assumed 
>>> that the non existence of god is category 1 or 2 knowledge (because 
>>> it would be for you?) whereas it is actually category 3. Also 
>>> possibly confusing is that I admit that for theists the negation may 
>>> also be category 3. I don't see a problem in that because we are 
>>> different people.
>>>
>> body else, has never seen.
>>
>> And yet.. You miss category 4: "Because the negation would contradict 
>> societal ideas and social beliefs, which I am heavily invested in." 
> 
> I don't see the difference with my category 3. Then again I have 
> sometimes difficulty to understand what you exactly mean.
> 
Ok, I see what you mean. Yeah, they are the same in the case that I 
actually mention. However, there is what might be called the "Stockholm 
Syndrome" version of the same rule, which states that, on some level, 
they know its all delusional BS, but have become so invested in 
following it, that giving it up feels like the world will end, and the 
consequence of being wrong is both socially too high, and emotionally 
too extreme, to accept. That, in the end, its basically become like a 
phobia of germs, where elaborate ritual is performed, to avoid the 
otherwise non-existent consequences of coming in contact with what is 
*not* actually detrimental. It simply *has to be*, or otherwise the 
phobia would be a horrible self deception, and that just isn't acceptable.

-- 
void main () {
   If Schrödingers_cat is alive or version > 98 {
     if version = "Vista" {
       call slow_by_half();
       call DRM_everything();
     }
     call functional_code();
   }
   else
     call crash_windows();
}

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3D Content, and 3D Software at DAZ3D!</A>

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andrel wrote:
> Let me put it this way: I say I *'know'* something if it is beyond 
> reasonable doubt for *me*.

Yes. And when I say I *know* something, it means I believe it, and I have a 
reason to believe it. Whether it's actually "true" has to be accessed by 
someone other than myself, because I could be mistaken in my reasons for 
believing.

I sometimes informally say I "know" something when I really mean I am 
strongly convinced I'm right. Unless it's actually true, however, it's not 
knowledge. And since it's possible we're all mistaken entirely about the 
reality of the universe's existence, it's remotely possible that what we all 
have strong justification for believing is indeed not knowledge but mistaken 
belief.

> 3) when the negation would be incompatible with my existence (god does 
> not exist)
> Possibly an underlying problem in this discussion is that you assumed 
> that the non existence of god is category 1 or 2 knowledge (because it 
> would be for you?) whereas it is actually category 3. 

I'm not just talking about belief in a god. I'm talking (if I remember after 
a week's vacation) about the meaning of the word "knowledge."

I'm trying to distinguish the word "knowledge" from "conviction." If you 
don't admit there are cases where you can be convinced something is true 
that isn't knowledge, i.e., if you think that being strongly convinced of 
something is enough to make it "knowledge", then we're just disagreeing 
about the word. I feel that making "knowledge" mean "topic about which I'm 
strongly convinced regardless of the truth of the referent" just muddles the 
word and leaves us with no word that means "something that I believe and is 
true."

Bringing arguments about deities into the picture is just muddling the 
conversation, because neither side is likely to admit that the other side 
might have a justified belief.

> To which I countered that there is virtually nothing that we can be sure 
> of and for those things that we are certain about we can always question 
> the method by which we are certain. The logical conclusion is that under 
> your rules there is no knowledge at all.

It depends on how certain you want to be. Of course if we're all brains in a 
bottle, then we are all 100% incorrect about the universe.

However, if I'm justified in believing X is true, and X is true, then that's 
knowledge. If X is false, that's not knowledge. You wish to muddle the 
waters by saying that whether X is true or not is irrelevant.

>> Right. And I keep repeating that while there are many differences of 
>> opinion, there are also many facts about which there are few 
>> differences of opinion.
> 
> How many is a few and who is to draw the line?

Irrelevant. If you accept objective reality, there are things that are true 
about it and things that aren't, whether you know which is which or not.

>> But I didn't say we could distinguish confidently between whether 
>> something that is disputed is knowledge and something that is disputed 
>> is not knowledge.
> 
> So why would you object if someone says that for him it is (or isn't)?

Because the justification and belief can make it so, but the objective 
reality defines truth. If you're arguing there is no objective reality at 
all, then what is or isn't knowledge is kind of pointless to discuss.

>> I'm not making rules. I'm simply saying that if he says he knows 
>> something, and that thing is false, then he's mistaken. I'm not saying 
>> he isn't confident.
> 
> And if he is confident that it is true would he be allowed to say it is 
> 'knowledge'?

"Allowed"?  Sure.  And if he's confident he's Jesus reincarnated, returned 
to start the Rapture, he'd be allowed to say he knows it. That doesn't mean 
it's true.

> I feel that time and time again we come back to a person 
> expressing something he knows is true versus you as an outsider claiming 
> he should not say that because *you* know different.

I think if you're going to claim as true something objective, you should 
have justification for that claim that is objective.

> That is because you are reasoning from your perspective not theirs or 
> mine. It is category 1 knowledge for them, so they are allowed to use 
> 'know'. Also I don't think they are wrong, I know, that is category 2.

Category 1 and 2 and 3 are the levels of justification. You can't both be right.

>> OK, so to you, there's no difference between knowing something and 
>> being confident it's true. I feel that's a loss.
> 
> There is, knowing implies a lot more than merely being confident.

Yes, but you've been unable to express what that is. I have already given 
you my definition. What's an example of a difference between being 
confident, justifiably confident, and having knowledge? What's the 
difference between "I'm convinced because of these reasons" and "I know it", 
other than "it's objectively true"?

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   "We'd like you to back-port all the changes in 2.0
    back to version 1.0."
   "We've done that already. We call it 2.0."

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On 16-8-2009 23:57, Darren New wrote:
> andrel wrote:
>> Let me put it this way: I say I *'know'* something if it is beyond 
>> reasonable doubt for *me*.
> 
> Yes. And when I say I *know* something, it means I believe it, and I 
> have a reason to believe it. Whether it's actually "true" has to be 
> accessed by someone other than myself, because I could be mistaken in my 
> reasons for believing.
> 
> I sometimes informally say I "know" something when I really mean I am 
> strongly convinced I'm right. Unless it's actually true, however, it's 
> not knowledge. And since it's possible we're all mistaken entirely about 
> the reality of the universe's existence, it's remotely possible that 
> what we all have strong justification for believing is indeed not 
> knowledge but mistaken belief.
> 
>> 3) when the negation would be incompatible with my existence (god does 
>> not exist)
>> Possibly an underlying problem in this discussion is that you assumed 
>> that the non existence of god is category 1 or 2 knowledge (because it 
>> would be for you?) whereas it is actually category 3. 
> 
> I'm not just talking about belief in a god. I'm talking (if I remember 
> after a week's vacation) about the meaning of the word "knowledge."
> 
> I'm trying to distinguish the word "knowledge" from "conviction." If you 
> don't admit there are cases where you can be convinced something is true 
> that isn't knowledge, i.e., if you think that being strongly convinced 
> of something is enough to make it "knowledge", then we're just 
> disagreeing about the word. I feel that making "knowledge" mean "topic 
> about which I'm strongly convinced regardless of the truth of the 
> referent" just muddles the word and leaves us with no word that means 
> "something that I believe and is true."
> 
> Bringing arguments about deities into the picture is just muddling the 
> conversation, because neither side is likely to admit that the other 
> side might have a justified belief.
> 
>> To which I countered that there is virtually nothing that we can be 
>> sure of and for those things that we are certain about we can always 
>> question the method by which we are certain. The logical conclusion is 
>> that under your rules there is no knowledge at all.
> 
> It depends on how certain you want to be. Of course if we're all brains 
> in a bottle, then we are all 100% incorrect about the universe.
> 
> However, if I'm justified in believing X is true, and X is true, then 
> that's knowledge. If X is false, that's not knowledge. You wish to 
> muddle the waters by saying that whether X is true or not is irrelevant.
> 
>>> Right. And I keep repeating that while there are many differences of 
>>> opinion, there are also many facts about which there are few 
>>> differences of opinion.
>>
>> How many is a few and who is to draw the line?
> 
> Irrelevant. If you accept objective reality, there are things that are 
> true about it and things that aren't, whether you know which is which or 
> not.
> 
>>> But I didn't say we could distinguish confidently between whether 
>>> something that is disputed is knowledge and something that is 
>>> disputed is not knowledge.
>>
>> So why would you object if someone says that for him it is (or isn't)?
> 
> Because the justification and belief can make it so, but the objective 
> reality defines truth. If you're arguing there is no objective reality 
> at all, then what is or isn't knowledge is kind of pointless to discuss.
> 
>>> I'm not making rules. I'm simply saying that if he says he knows 
>>> something, and that thing is false, then he's mistaken. I'm not 
>>> saying he isn't confident.
>>
>> And if he is confident that it is true would he be allowed to say it 
>> is 'knowledge'?
> 
> "Allowed"?  Sure.  And if he's confident he's Jesus reincarnated, 
> returned to start the Rapture, he'd be allowed to say he knows it. That 
> doesn't mean it's true.
> 
>> I feel that time and time again we come back to a person expressing 
>> something he knows is true versus you as an outsider claiming he 
>> should not say that because *you* know different.
> 
> I think if you're going to claim as true something objective, you should 
> have justification for that claim that is objective.
> 
>> That is because you are reasoning from your perspective not theirs or 
>> mine. It is category 1 knowledge for them, so they are allowed to use 
>> 'know'. Also I don't think they are wrong, I know, that is category 2.
> 
> Category 1 and 2 and 3 are the levels of justification. You can't both 
> be right.
> 
>>> OK, so to you, there's no difference between knowing something and 
>>> being confident it's true. I feel that's a loss.
>>
>> There is, knowing implies a lot more than merely being confident.
> 
> Yes, but you've been unable to express what that is. I have already 
> given you my definition. What's an example of a difference between being 
> confident, justifiably confident, and having knowledge? What's the 
> difference between "I'm convinced because of these reasons" and "I know 
> it", other than "it's objectively true"?

I think that if I answer all your points separately I would be repeating 
myself too many times, so let's just do it once.
My definition was given before as: beyond reasonable doubt.
So we have both given our definition, we both feel that that should be 
clear and we both think that the definition of the other has too many 
holes. Seems to show to me that we use different standards. ;)

About the objective reality. Sure, it must exist. I am living in one and 
so are you. Only, neither of those two need to coincide with the 
objective objective reality. The reason being that before we can agree 
on what objectively true is we need to agree on the rules to define what 
is objective. I am pretty sure we would not agree on those. And above 
that is another meta level...

The reason for bringing it deities is that it make the point clearer, at 
least that is what I think. For me it is simple, no god (in the 
conventional) sense exist. As I said that is category 3. There is no way 
for me to come to any other conclusion nor is there anything anybody can 
say that would instil any doubt in me. Hence 'beyond reasonable doubt' 
i.e. absolute truth and fully justified to use words like 'know' and 
'knowledge'. That I know that there are other people just as confident 
as I am about the inverse is, for me, irrelevant. Simply a matter of 
different objective realities.
I am confident about a lot of other stuff, but my life would be the same 
if it turned out not to be so.

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Am Mon, 03 Aug 2009 14:13:18 -0500 schrieb David H. Burns:

> Darren New wrote:
> 
>> Brain damage:
>>   The man who mistook his wife for a hat
> 
> Very interesting book. All of the author's (Oliver Sacks) books, that I
> have read,
>   are well worth reading.

Definitely!

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