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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Warp [mailto:war### [at] tag povray org]
> 1) Everything is deterministic.
> 2) Everything is chaotic. Uncertain quantum states make it so that
> it's
> absolutely impossible to predict what effects certain actions will
> have.
> It may well go one way or another (or even both ways at the same
> time!).
> By the rules of the Universe it's physically impossible to predict
what
> will happen in the future from current events, because people will
make
> completely random and unpredictable choices which, deep down, are a
> consequence of the complete uncertainty of quantum interactions.
The second option, when you get down to it, sounds suspiciously like the
first. Specifically that last bit, that everything is the result of
quantum interactions.
Now, quantum interactions appear random to us, but if it were possible
to "zoom in" sufficiently, we might determine otherwise.
Anyway, the two options would really be:
1) Everything is deterministic
2) Everything is non-deterministic
The source of the non-determinism could be free will, randomness, God,
or whatever else you want to explain it.
...Ben Chambers
www.pacificwebguy.com
What's the difference between a drug dealer and a whore?
A whore can wash her crack and sell it again.
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Warp <war### [at] tag povray org> wrote:
> 2) Everything is chaotic. Uncertain quantum states make it so that it's
> absolutely impossible to predict what effects certain actions will have.
> It may well go one way or another (or even both ways at the same time!).
> By the rules of the Universe it's physically impossible to predict what
> will happen in the future from current events, because people will make
> completely random and unpredictable choices which, deep down, are a
> consequence of the complete uncertainty of quantum interactions.
>
> In the second case you are not choosing. You are acting completely at
> random (even if this randomness can be seen only in the tiniest of details).
> You are not making decisions based on choice, but based on how some
> quantum states happen to be at some point in time (at any point in the
> timeline).
How can we know that it is the random quantum interactions that cause our
decisions (at a very subtle level) and not our "decisions" that cause the
random quantum interactions (again at a very subtle level)? In other words, how
can we know that human *or* some other consciousness can't in fact have effect
on the world through these very seemingly random quantum interactions? Since we
have no way to predict these interactions it would seem it would be a loophole
which makes room for any external (or internal but currently unknown) influence
on our observable universe.
Just a thought.
(Note: Any argument that no influence could be exerted this way because the
random quantum interactions are predictable at a statistical level undermines
the whole original argument that we are controlled by randomness to some
degree.)
Rune
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Warp wrote:
> How can *any* hypothesis which states how the Universe came into existence
> be testable?
It can make predictions that are or are not borne out, the same as any
other. For example, the "big bang" theory postulates that the universe can
only be a certain age (based on the size of the observable universe and the
speed of light). It postulates that the background radiation could not have
gotten across the universe in the length of time the universe has existed,
and therefore should not be as smooth as it is. Hence the theory of
"inflation". It postulates that deceleration due to gravity should be
getting smaller, while instead it's actually negative. Hence the theory of
"dark energy". And so on.
If we found things were not moving apart at a speed apparently explicable by
gravity, then we might have the steady-state theory. Which would require a
different explanation of how the universe came about.
But no, that's why the call it a singularity. Stuff breaks down there.
If you want to argue that something from *before* the singularity has
persisted *after* the singularity, you'd need to give evidence. Like I said,
I don't have trouble with a "first cause". I think one would have to provide
some evidence it answers prayers of humans, if one intends to try to
convince me of that possibility, tho.
> It's more or less by definition impossible to replicate the
> circumstances of the Big Bang (eg. for the simple reason that time-space
> is not currently in the same state as it was at the moment the Big Bang
> happened).
You can extrapolate backwards from what you can experiment with, just like
you can look out into outer space and, without traveling to the stars, you
can determine there likely was a big bang.
But yes, as I said, it's a singularity, so figuring out what was *before*
the big bang requires it to be recreated on the "pre" side of the bang. If
we manage to create a little universe in a lab, we'd probably have a good
idea of the cause of the big bang that made ours. Or at least an explanation
with *some* evidence in support.
> For this reason one hypothesis is as good as any other.
Nope. The hypothesis that "something created the universe" doesn't provide
any information we didn't already have. It doesn't "explain" anything.
>> In any case, my comment was more along the lines of "free will implies there
>> needn't be a first cause", not "there was no first cause."
>
> What is "free will"? Do we have free will (regardless of what is your
> world view)? Or is free will just an illusion?
I can certainly give you my answer. But I'm not sure that helps anything.
> However, in neither case can you speak of true "freedom of choice".
Right. I don't think either of those has anything to do with "free will" in
my book. Nor is "free will" an illusion.
> Even if we make a mix of the two extremes, can it be called "free will"
> even then? Your choices are only either a consequence of your past, or
> caused by quantum uncertainty.
It can certainly be called "free will" at that point, or at either of the
others. I don't think asking "what is free will" or "do we have free will"
is an effective approach to the problem. I expect everyone has made at least
one "choice" that they thought they made freely, even if it was a trivial
and meaningless choice. I think investigating the question of "what sorts of
beings/objects have free will" takes you much closer to figuring out the
nature of free will. Do rocks have free will? Do individual ants have free
will? Does an ant colony taken as a whole have free will? Does a government
have free will?
--
Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
The NFL should go international. I'd pay to
see the Detroit Lions vs the Roman Catholics.
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From: Kevin Wampler
Subject: Re: Just a passing thought on religion
Date: 21 Dec 2008 19:31:19
Message: <494edfd7@news.povray.org>
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Darren New wrote:
> The existence of "free will" negates the argument that God must have
> created the universe as a "first cause".
>
> The "first cause" argument is that every effect has a cause, and hence
> for the universe to exist, something before the universe must have
> caused it, and hence God exists.[1]
>
> On the other hand, either our decisions are caused by what's in the
> environment, or some aspect of our decisions are not subject to prior
> causes. In the first case, it would be unjust to blame someone for not
> believing in your religion if such disbelief is entirely the fault of
> external circumstances. In the latter case, many decisions have effects
> without precedent cause, and hence the requirement for God to have
> created the universe disappears.
I don't think that the latter bit of this argument necessarily holds
without some additional assumptions about the nature by which decisions
arise. The view which, I imagine, would be taken by someone arguing
both for God and for free will is that our decisions are not caused by
the material state of the universe precisely because we are conscious
agents (ie have "souls" from a religious perspective).
The view here would be that the *only* uncaused effects are those
arising from a conscious agent. Thus if something before the universe
must have caused it, that something must have been an act by a conscious
agent. Since "conscious agent that created the universe" sounds almost
exactly like a standard definition of God, by this like of reasoning, it
seems to lead to an argument *for* the necessity in a God creating the
universe rather than against it.
Of course this all depends on a particular viewpoint on free will, but
it seems to be the one that you're talking in your argument so I think
it's valid. Even if a dualistic view of the mind with respect to free
will wasn't want you had intended, I suspect that it's almost certainly
a common viewpoint of those who would argue for both God and free will,
so your counterargument will still need to address the relationship
between mind and body more directly to be convincing.
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Chambers wrote:
> Now, quantum interactions appear random to us, but if it were possible
> to "zoom in" sufficiently, we might determine otherwise.
As I understand it, this has been conclusively disproven in ways not too
difficult to understand.
> The source of the non-determinism could be free will, randomness, God,
> or whatever else you want to explain it.
If you have a source of non-determinism, then it isn't non-deterministic any
more. :-)
--
Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
The NFL should go international. I'd pay to
see the Detroit Lions vs the Roman Catholics.
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Kevin Wampler wrote:
> both for God and for free will is that our decisions are not caused by
> the material state of the universe precisely because we are conscious
> agents (ie have "souls" from a religious perspective).
Well, the existence of the "soul" is another question. One can reasonably
question what is even meant by "the soul".
> The view here would be that the *only* uncaused effects are those
> arising from a conscious agent. Thus if something before the universe
> must have caused it, that something must have been an act by a conscious
> agent. Since "conscious agent that created the universe" sounds almost
> exactly like a standard definition of God, by this like of reasoning, it
> seems to lead to an argument *for* the necessity in a God creating the
> universe rather than against it.
Thank you. That's exactly the sort of counter-argument I was looking for.
That's not how the "first cause" argument is usually argued - I've never
seen an argument that uncaused events can be caused by conciousness.
Generally, the uncaused events are caused by a god, and the god doesn't need
a cause because he's always been present.
However, it certainly shoots down my line of reasoning, if one assumes
"consciousness" can cause otherwise un-caused events.
Then, of course, you can get into an argument over what "consciousness" is,
but that's another argument and (in my opinion) rather easier to discuss.
> so your counterargument will still need to address the relationship
> between mind and body more directly to be convincing.
Yes it would. (Actually, I suspect anyone who would actually argue with me
this way is far beyond convincing, but that's another question.)
--
Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
The NFL should go international. I'd pay to
see the Detroit Lions vs the Roman Catholics.
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From: Kevin Wampler
Subject: Re: Just a passing thought on religion
Date: 21 Dec 2008 20:13:18
Message: <494ee9ae@news.povray.org>
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Darren New wrote:
> Well, the existence of the "soul" is another question. One can
> reasonably question what is even meant by "the soul".
I completely agree. Since the question was phrased in religious terms I
was merely trying to phrase the answer in the same way as well.
Personally, I'm iffy enough on what "free will" means and how to make it
coherent to actually attempt to argue about something more difficult
still like a soul.
> That's not how the "first cause" argument is usually argued - I've never
> seen an argument that uncaused events can be caused by conciousness.
> Generally, the uncaused events are caused by a god, and the god doesn't
> need a cause because he's always been present.
I haven't seen it argued this way either, but I'd be quite surprised if
the argument isn't commonly considered in more modern philosophical
discussions of the topic. It seems like a pretty natural response, and
fits well with the sort of dualistic conception of the mind taken by
many religious people.
> Then, of course, you can get into an argument over what "consciousness"
> is, but that's another argument and (in my opinion) rather easier to
> discuss.
A completely agree. Though technically speaking the argument still
works if you replace "conscious agent" with "free agent". It's just
that (in my view) our conception of free will is so closely tied with
our concept on consciousness (however vague) that it's more intuitively
compelling to state it that way.
Said differently, you only need to push the argument to one about
consciousness to the degree that you believe free will necessitates
consciousness, although it's probably reasonable for a proponent to take
that view as a "free but not conscious" God is a rather odd concept.
> Yes it would. (Actually, I suspect anyone who would actually argue with
> me this way is far beyond convincing, but that's another question.)
But at least they could also be rational in being unconvinced!
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Darren New wrote:
> Chambers wrote:
>> Now, quantum interactions appear random to us, but if it were possible
>> to "zoom in" sufficiently, we might determine otherwise.
>
> As I understand it, this has been conclusively disproven in ways not too
> difficult to understand.
Unless you mean merely to imply that such "zooming in" is theoretically
impossible, to my (very limited) knowledge on this subject I don't think
that this is true. At least as far as classical quantum mechanics is
concerned, it is possible for the predictions to arise from entirely
deterministic, with the caveat that you have to allow for
faster-than-light interactions.
The most relevant theorem is known as Bell's theorem:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%27s_theorem, which you may remember
was employed in the paper arguing against Wolfram's CA view of physics
that I linked for you.
In fact, a deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics has been
mathematically laid out
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bohm_interpretation, although I don't know
how well it lends itself to attempts to unify it with general relativity
(although afaik, it's not clear how well standard QM is either).
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Kevin Wampler wrote:
> Darren New wrote:
>> Chambers wrote:
>>> Now, quantum interactions appear random to us, but if it were possible
>>> to "zoom in" sufficiently, we might determine otherwise.
>>
>> As I understand it, this has been conclusively disproven in ways not
>> too difficult to understand.
>
> Unless you mean merely to imply that such "zooming in" is theoretically
> impossible, to my (very limited) knowledge on this subject I don't think
> that this is true. At least as far as classical quantum mechanics is
> concerned, it is possible for the predictions to arise from entirely
> deterministic, with the caveat that you have to allow for
> faster-than-light interactions.
Yes. And recently, they've used a variant of the Bell Inequality to disprove
that it's due to non-local interactions.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kochen-Specker_theorem
(Or, for a more popular treatment:)
http://richarddawkins.net/article,2991,Do-subatomic-particles-have-free-will,Science-News
I'm not sure if this is the one I read about, but I think someone did an
experiment and validated this experimentally, basically by running Bell's
Inequality sorts of tests on a whole sphere of points rather than just two
directions.
http://meetings.aps.org/Meeting/MAR08/Event/76135
disagrees.
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v446/n7138/abs/nature05677.html
may be what I remember reading about, but I don't know where the popular
reference to it is. I can't seem to find the article about someone actually
doing the experiment that the math implies and finding it worked, but it was
pretty clear that they eliminated non-local interactions thereby.
> The most relevant theorem is known as Bell's theorem:
Yes, I've pointed that out to people here before, I believe. :-)
> In fact, a deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics has been
> mathematically laid out
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bohm_interpretation, although I don't know
> how well it lends itself to attempts to unify it with general relativity
> (although afaik, it's not clear how well standard QM is either).
AFAIK, QED and GR are at odds because GR assumes a non-quantum
everywhere-differentiable space, basically.
--
Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
The NFL should go international. I'd pay to
see the Detroit Lions vs the Roman Catholics.
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> The existence of "free will" negates the argument that God must have
> created the universe as a "first cause".
>
> The "first cause" argument is that every effect has a cause, and hence for
> the universe to exist, something before the universe must have caused it,
> and hence God exists.[1]
>
> On the other hand, either our decisions are caused by what's in the
> environment, or some aspect of our decisions are not subject to prior
> causes. In the first case, it would be unjust to blame someone for not
> believing in your religion if such disbelief is entirely the fault of
> external circumstances. In the latter case, many decisions have effects
> without precedent cause, and hence the requirement for God to have created
> the universe disappears.
>
> Thoughts?
Why does the first case rule out the possibility of God having created the
universe? Or do you mean that if "the decisions" are entirely made based on
the environment, there must have been "something else" at the beginning
because otherwise no decisions could be made to start the universe?
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