somebody wrote:
> Good point. But does that we can imagine Event Horizon mean that we can
> imagine anything and everything worse? Maybe the bad smell objectors can
> imagine us but not Event Horizon. And yet, imagination may not be the key. I
> can imagine an 824 billion light years tall man - or rather, I may think, or
> claim, that I can imagine such a thing. You can very well doubt the
> legitimacy of such imagination. I can similarly doubt that
> bad-smell-objectors can legitimately imagine Even Horizon, let alone us.

Tangental to that, on the topic of imagination.  The brain-in-vat thing 
is shot down by the idea that, if we *were*, we'd be unable to conceive 
of the notion of a brain-in-a-vat.  But doesn't that totally disregard 
imagination?  We can imagine things that we have no experience of, and 
assign form to things that may or may not even be able to exist.

> Necessity of evil is a theistic angle. I don't find evil necessary - that
> would be like finding gravity necessary. Gravity is not necessary, it just
> is. However, I find it pretty much necessary that there will be things that
> sentient beings will find evil, for senses have to differentiate between
> inputs.

Gravity might well be necessary, once we discover what the heck it IS.

--
Tim Cook
http://empyrean.freesitespace.net

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Darren New wrote:
> I think that this is a bogus argument, basically because it's trivial to 
> imagine a world where all the things that taste good are the ones that 
> are good for you. Being forced to eat broccoli seems like evil because 
> it *is* evil - it's bad that healthy stuff tastes awful. Indeed, it's 
> bad that there even is such a thing as unhealthy food.

I never had a problem with eating broccoli.  And the first time I tried 
brussels sprouts when I was a kid, I was greatly confused at their 
infamy, as I found them rather tasty.

--
Tim Cook
http://empyrean.freesitespace.net

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Tim Cook wrote:
> Tangental to that, on the topic of imagination.  The brain-in-vat thing 
> is shot down by the idea that, if we *were*, we'd be unable to conceive 
> of the notion of a brain-in-a-vat. 

I can't imagine why that would be the case. No, if we're all computer 
simulations, you could argue that the simulation might be programmed to 
prevent us from noticing it's a simulation. But an evolved brain in a vat?

> Gravity might well be necessary, once we discover what the heck it IS.

I think the whole concept of "necessary" conflicts with the concept of 
"omnipotence."

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Kevin Wampler wrote:
> "Of course, one of the consequences of this is then that we are also to
o 
> cognitively limited to understand what’s right and wrong"
> 
> This, unfortunately, doesn't follow from the point I'm making.  What 
> would follow is that we're too cognitively limited to understand what's
 
> right and wrong for *God*, but it's perfectly consistent to believe tha
t 
> doesn't at all preclude us from understand what's right and wrong for 
> humans.

I think the idea that there are different kinds of good and evil is at od
ds 
with the concept that doing what God wants is good. You're still using th
e 
"god moves in mysterious ways" argument, that we cannot understand what 
"good" is. You're just modifying it by saying "we can understand human go
od, 
but not god good." For most christians and muslims, I think the idea that
 
god's goodness is inferior to human goodness is bogus. The idea that ther
e 
are things that humans can do that's good that God would think is evil or
 
vice versa doesn't fly. Perhaps he didn't state that explicitly.

But as soon as you start putting in relativistic goodness rather than 
absolute goodness, where something that's good for me is bad for you, the
n 
the whole "do what God says" justification goes out the window.

> Now, I realize that this may come across as "well maybe God wanted us t
o 
> get polio", but that's not the view I'm talking about.  Rather it's the
 
> view that God's decisions would be made at a scale so much larger than 

> ours that there might well be reasons (possibly beyond our 
> comprehension) which make a universe which allows such things a "good" 

> thing.  One might even say this would be expected considering the 
> immeasurably vast scale on which God would be making decisions.

Sure. That's the "free will" argument. God allows evil because disallowin
g 
people being evil to each other would reduce their "free will" to commit 
evil.

I don't think you're going to find many full-blown step-by-step explanati
ons 
on the topic, because it has already been beaten to death for the last 30
00 
years.

> What this particular line of reasoning *would* entail, however, is that
 
> the concept of good as it applies to God sure doesn't seem to involve 
> minimizing our earthly suffering as it's primary factor

I think that's what he's talking about in the second half. If by definiti
on 
God is good, and goodness doesn't involve minimizing suffering, then bein
g 
tortured and killed is good.

>> Otherwise, I'm not seeing what you're trying to say. Maybe I'm just 
>> dense today.
> 
> I suppose I'd say that my point is that one could take the view that ou
r 
> earthly suffering simply isn't the primary factor in the decisions made
 
> by God, and that this doesn't preclude that there may be many ways in 
> which such a God could be "good".

Well, the christian God is supposed to be a personal god. The Islamic god
 is 
in control of every aspect of life, as I understand it.

This certainly works if God is either not omnipotent or doesn't really ca
re 
about people. But then you wind up with gods like Zeus.

> His argument, on the other hand, seems to be implicitly using the 
> assumption that God is chose how to make the universe with the reductio
n 
> of earthly human suffering as the primary moral factor. 

I don't think so. His assumption is "God is good and omnipotent" plus "ev
il 
exists". So you're either saying "human suffering isn't evil" or "God isn
't 
omnipotent enough to make a world with less evil than it now contains."

If you start with the assumption that God's idea of "good" doesn't match 

ours, then you're ignoring the "God is good" assumption, which of course 
has 
to read as an absolute. Otherwise you have no moral standing to tell peop
le 
what God wants them to do.

Anyway, what I thought you were saying is along the lines of "it's good t
o 
discover the secrets of how atoms work", and "it's evil to use that to bl
ow 
up cities". Just because the holocaust happened doesn't mean it's inheren
tly 
evil to create a world in which the holocaust can happen.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Darren New wrote:
> I think the whole concept of "necessary" conflicts with the concept of 
> "omnipotence."

Why?  As a supposition:  gravity is necessary as the mechanism by which 
mass affects things, which does not preclude God being aware of all 
properties of all particles and fields in existence.

The Heisenberg uncertainty principle, however, *does* preclude omnipotence.

--
Tim Cook
http://empyrean.freesitespace.net

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Tim Cook wrote:
> Darren New wrote:
>> I think the whole concept of "necessary" conflicts with the concept of 
>> "omnipotence."
> 
> Why?  As a supposition:  gravity is necessary as the mechanism by which 
> mass affects things, which does not preclude God being aware of all 
> properties of all particles and fields in existence.

You're confusing omniscience with omnipotence.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Darren New wrote:
> I think the idea that there are different kinds of good and evil is at 
> odds with the concept that doing what God wants is good. You're still 
> using the "god moves in mysterious ways" argument, that we cannot 
> understand what "good" is. You're just modifying it by saying "we can 
> understand human good, but not god good." For most christians and 
> muslims, I think the idea that god's goodness is inferior to human 
> goodness is bogus. The idea that there are things that humans can do 
> that's good that God would think is evil or vice versa doesn't fly. 
> Perhaps he didn't state that explicitly.
> 
> But as soon as you start putting in relativistic goodness rather than 
> absolute goodness, where something that's good for me is bad for you, 
> then the whole "do what God says" justification goes out the window.

I suspect they might be more amenable to the concept that God's "good" 
is superior (rather than inferior) to the human version.  Theoretically 
  it could also be the case that the underlying concepts are the same 
but that God's decisions are so vast that we can't comprehend how the 
same principles are are work.

Nevertheless, I should make clear that I wasn't talking about 
"mainstream" Christian/Muslim viewpoints.  Perhaps the author was, and 
by beef is really that he didn't make that more clear.


> Sure. That's the "free will" argument. God allows evil because 
> disallowing people being evil to each other would reduce their "free 
> will" to commit evil.

Free will is one scenario which would fit under such an explanation, but 
one could probably imagine others as well.


> Well, the christian God is supposed to be a personal god. The Islamic 
> god is in control of every aspect of life, as I understand it.
> 
> This certainly works if God is either not omnipotent or doesn't really 
> care about people. But then you wind up with gods like Zeus.

You could make the view work with a personal God by assuming that all 
our earthly suffering end up being for the better (or unimportant) once 
you consider the afterlife (not a traditional view, I'm aware, but I 
think it's consistent).


> If you start with the assumption that God's idea of "good" doesn't match 
> ours, then you're ignoring the "God is good" assumption, which of course 
> has to read as an absolute. Otherwise you have no moral standing to tell 
> people what God wants them to do.

Oh yes, certainly.  Under this view it's much tricker to make claims 
about what God wants us to do, although I still think it's possible. 
For instance, once could assume that morality is based on intent rather 
than action.  Then we could still know what's good, and this would 
coincide with what God thinks is good.  The difference is that we would 
have no reason to think that we would actually *do* what God would have 
done, but rather that what's important is that we did it for noble reasons.

Under this view the apparent existence of evil (assuming omnipotence) 
would be because God's considerations is creating the universe are far 
removed from our day-to-day sufferings (surely a plausible assumption). 
  Again, I agree that you'd need more work to fit this into a standard 
Christian view, but I suspect it's fully possible.


> Anyway, what I thought you were saying is along the lines of "it's good 
> to discover the secrets of how atoms work", and "it's evil to use that 
> to blow up cities". Just because the holocaust happened doesn't mean 
> it's inherently evil to create a world in which the holocaust can happen.

I was also making this point, which one would classify under the 
umbrella of "God has the same morality, but makes decisions at a 
different scale".

I think the main problem is that I took him to be arguing against 
problem of evil rebuttals in the abstract, philosophical sense, whereas 
he seems to be making a point only about particular sorts of theistic 
views in which you have a relatively personal God and in which our time 
on Earth really does matter (as opposed to the afterlife being the man 
deal).  Certainly many people have exactly these views, but since I'd 
assumed he was making a broader argument his insistence on attacking 
that one section seemed like a "straw man" argument to me.

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Kevin Wampler wrote:
> I suspect they might be more amenable to the concept that God's "good" 
> is superior (rather than inferior) to the human version. 

And what exactly does that mean?  That there are things God thinks are good 
that we think are evil?  That there are things we think are good that God 
thinks are evil? Both?

If God thinks things are good that we think are evil, then God isn't 
benevolent. After all, Hitler thought he was improving the race, so *he* 
didn't think it was evil.

If God thinks things are evil that we think are good, then God's will is 
that we do evil (as far as we know) things, which pretty much sums up the 
"you deserve to be tortured" bit.

> Theoretically 
>  it could also be the case that the underlying concepts are the same but 
> that God's decisions are so vast that we can't comprehend how the same 
> principles are are work.

In other words, "God really is good, but he's so mysterious that we can't 
tell that."  In other words, "the evil you see isn't really evil, but it's 
really good, because God willed it and God is good, even though we don't 
have any evidence supporting that in his behavior."

> Nevertheless, I should make clear that I wasn't talking about 
> "mainstream" Christian/Muslim viewpoints.  Perhaps the author was, and 
> by beef is really that he didn't make that more clear.

I think it's clear he's talking about a God who actually cares, yes.

> You could make the view work with a personal God by assuming that all 
> our earthly suffering end up being for the better (or unimportant) once 
> you consider the afterlife (not a traditional view, I'm aware, but I 
> think it's consistent).

And I think that falls under the "it's not really evil after all" argument. 
Neither polio and the holocaust are really bad, ya see, because otherwise 
God would be allowing bad things.

> Oh yes, certainly.  Under this view it's much tricker to make claims 
> about what God wants us to do, although I still think it's possible. For 
> instance, once could assume that morality is based on intent rather than 
> action.  Then we could still know what's good, and this would coincide 
> with what God thinks is good.  The difference is that we would have no 
> reason to think that we would actually *do* what God would have done, 
> but rather that what's important is that we did it for noble reasons.

Makes sense, but conflicts with people who want to tell you what to do 
because their God said so.

> Certainly many people have exactly these views, but since I'd 
> assumed he was making a broader argument his insistence on attacking 
> that one section seemed like a "straw man" argument to me.

Fair nuff.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Darren New wrote:
> You're confusing omniscience with omnipotence.

Er.  Ah, that too.

But does omnipotence mean you must exert all forces yourself, or only 
that you are able to do so?  Can an omnipotent being create a mechanism 
to do a subset of their work for them, or are they obligated to always 
do all work at all times?

--
Tim Cook
http://empyrean.freesitespace.net

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Tim Cook wrote:
> Darren New wrote:
>> You're confusing omniscience with omnipotence.
> 
> Er.  Ah, that too.
> 
> But does omnipotence mean you must exert all forces yourself, or only 
> that you are able to do so?  Can an omnipotent being create a mechanism 
> to do a subset of their work for them, or are they obligated to always 
> do all work at all times?

I don't think it matters, if you assert that an omnipotent being can have/do 
anything he wants. If he doesn't want evil, he just makes it such that there 
is no evil.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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