http://directionlessbones.wordpress.com/2009/10/31/challenge-suggest-a-more-evil-principle-than-this-one/


-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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"Darren New" <dne### [at] sanrrcom> wrote in message
news:4aee2616$1@news.povray.org...

>
http://directionlessbones.wordpress.com/2009/10/31/challenge-suggest-a-more-evil-principle-than-this-one/

It's longwinded and does not seem to bring anything new to the argument from
evil.

In fact, even as an atheist, I don't think the argument from evil is a
particularly strong one. For evil is a sliding scale. Imagine for a moment
that there were no death and suffering, at all, in another universe
populated with other beings. Would we then, those beings (forget religious
books for a moment), conclude that there were no evil? Of course not. The
most distasteful thing that's present then, however benign by our standards,
would be considered evil by those beings in that universe. Foul smells, say,
would become the very definition of evil, and those beings would ask and
conclude "why oh why does Beelzebub allow foul smells to be emitted? Since
such an evil exists, there can be no god".

And let's say their "god" or "laws of universe" prevented all foul smells
from being emitted, by sentinent and non-sentinent beings alike. Would that
be end of evil? No. It would then be elevator music, and the ability of
their fellow beings to compose such horrorful melodies would be construed as
evil. The bottomline is, then, if you want to eliminate evil, all
possibilities for objectionable outcomes or behaviours need to be pruned.
This will eventually eliminate *everything*, from bright lights to sharp
corners to hard to open blister packages to slow booting computers, since a
thinking being can find anything objectionable. This is close to, but not
the same thing as the free will argument.

So the premise, "there is evil in the universe", is, to quote Pauli, not
even wrong. I would counter that what we perceive as evil are simply foul
smells. For now we can go on the other direction and imagine a universe
where much worse things happen much more frequently. Does the fact that we
don't live in an Event Horizon (the movie) universe could mean there is no
evil? Hence, I think, the premise is meaningless.

One can, always, of course, focus on "evil as described in the Bible". But
if one's to take all of Bible as literally true (a point which even
christians don't take), then there are much stronger and less metaphysical
arguments for concuding that it's nonsense and inconsistent.

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somebody schrieb:

> And let's say their "god" or "laws of universe" prevented all foul smells
> from being emitted, by sentinent and non-sentinent beings alike. Would that
> be end of evil? No. It would then be elevator music, and the ability of
> their fellow beings to compose such horrorful melodies would be construed as
> evil. The bottomline is, then, if you want to eliminate evil, all
> possibilities for objectionable outcomes or behaviours need to be pruned.
> This will eventually eliminate *everything*, from bright lights to sharp
> corners to hard to open blister packages to slow booting computers, since a
> thinking being can find anything objectionable.

Not only would you need to eliminate any "negatives" - however benign - 
but also any "not-so-positives":

Even if you can eliminate all elevator music (ah, what a great world 
that would be!), people would find evil in some performance of Bach's 
music not because it was bad, but because the Chopin concerto they heard 
the other day was still better.


There is some truth to "all that humans deserve is punishment and 
death", if you read it with a different mindset:

"There's nothing good that you have a /right/ to, so stop bickering 
about the things in life that just aren't as perfect as you'd like them 
to be."

(Make sure to /not/ read this as an excuse to treat other people bad.)


> if one's to take all of Bible as literally true (a point which even
> christians don't take),

You'd be surprised.

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somebody wrote:
> In fact, even as an atheist, I don't think the argument from evil is a
> particularly strong one. For evil is a sliding scale.

So you're making exactly the argument of "well, the world doesn't really 

contain evil after all," which is exactly the phrasing I found interestin
g 
in the article.

You're doing the Descartes bit here. "In order to know good, we must know
 
evil first."  I think the fact that we *can* imagine things like Event 
Horizon means we have a pretty good idea of a sliding scale of evil. What
 if 
the "bad smell objectors" imagined Event Horizon and our world too. Would
n't 
they conclude the evil isn't all that bad?

> I would counter that what we perceive as evil are simply foul
> smells. 

"bulk of the discussion then becomes a matter of theists arguing that 
actually, the world’s pretty great, the evil things in it are per
fectly 
justified and necessary,"

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Darren New <dne### [at] sanrrcom> wrote:
>
http://directionlessbones.wordpress.com/2009/10/31/challenge-suggest-a-more-evil-principle-than-this-one/

  I wonder what this fallacy is called:

1) If God is good, then X.
2) Clearly, not X.
3) Hence there is no God.

  Is it a non-sequitur? Deduction #3 does not follow from the other two.
(What would follow is "God is not good", not "there is no God".)

-- 
                                                          - Warp

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"Warp" <war### [at] tagpovrayorg> wrote in message 
news:4aef114b@news.povray.org...
> Darren New <dne### [at] sanrrcom> wrote:
>>
http://directionlessbones.wordpress.com/2009/10/31/challenge-suggest-a-more-evil-principle-than-this-one/
>
>  I wonder what this fallacy is called:
>
> 1) If God is good, then X.
> 2) Clearly, not X.
> 3) Hence there is no God.
>
>  Is it a non-sequitur? Deduction #3 does not follow from the other two.
> (What would follow is "God is not good", not "there is no God".)

I don't know for sure, but it's not exactly in the spirit of a non-sequitur, 
anyway.

One of the most common problems that arise from using this kind of logic, 
aside from poor definitions and baseless assumptions, is that often the "X" 
in the first step refers to something different from the "X" in the second 
step, which confuses the bejabbers out of some people.

One of my favorite bits of silliness:

A candle is brighter than nothing.
Nothing is brighter than the sun.
Therefore, a candle is brighter than the sun.

:D

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Warp wrote:
>   I wonder what this fallacy is called:
> 
> 1) If God is good, then X.
> 2) Clearly, not X.
> 3) Hence there is no God.
> 
>   Is it a non-sequitur? Deduction #3 does not follow from the other two.
> (What would follow is "God is not good", not "there is no God".)

You'd think.

But there's an extra, assumed step:
1b) God is good.

Which, quite frankly, is a stretch.

--
Tim Cook
http://empyrean.freesitespace.net

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Captain Jack wrote:
> A candle is brighter than nothing.
> Nothing is brighter than the sun.
> Therefore, a candle is brighter than the sun.

I prefer the form:
A ham sandwich is better than nothing.
Nothing is better than eternal happiness.
Therefore, a ham sandwich is better than eternal happiness.

--
Tim Cook
http://empyrean.freesitespace.net

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Tim Cook wrote:
> Warp wrote:
>>   I wonder what this fallacy is called:
>>
>> 1) If God is good, then X.
>> 2) Clearly, not X.
>> 3) Hence there is no God.
>>
>>   Is it a non-sequitur? Deduction #3 does not follow from the other two.
>> (What would follow is "God is not good", not "there is no God".)

Is every flawed reasoning a falacy? I think this is just a flawed reasoning.

> But there's an extra, assumed step:
> 1b) God is good.

Well, it's not assumed by the article in the link. It's explicitly stated. 
Obviously the same logic doesn't hold for Satan or Zeus, for example.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Darren New wrote:
>> But there's an extra, assumed step:
>> 1b) God is good.
> 
> Well, it's not assumed by the article in the link. It's explicitly 
> stated. Obviously the same logic doesn't hold for Satan or Zeus, for 
> example.


There's a further rather critical assumption in the article that's not 
explicitly stated: That the definition of "good" as it applies to God 
coincides with the definition of "good" as it applies to human actions.

I think it's a perfectly plausible position to take that our personal 
tragedies tell us quite a bit about human morality, but nothing about 
divine morality, and in context of this his arguments don't seem to 
work.  Of course this leaves open the issue of how we can coherently 
claim that God is "good" without being able to define what "good" means, 
but I can't see how he addresses this point.

Overall I was left with the distinct impression that he was arguing 
against straw-man versions to the resolutions to the problem of evil. 
Certainly there are people who do actually believe in things resembling 
these straw-man arguments, but it doesn't seem very philosophically 
useful to exert one's efforts in this direction.


I should qualify that I've never actually done any serious study into 
the problem of evil, so I'm more or less talking off the cuff here and 
might be making various substantial oversights/omissions.

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Kevin Wampler wrote:
> There's a further rather critical assumption in the article that's not 

> explicitly stated: That the definition of "good" as it applies to God 
> coincides with the definition of "good" as it applies to human actions.


Sure. And that's once again the "it isn't really evil, because then God 
would be doing evil" justification.

In other words, that's exactly what
"""
the bulk of the discussion then becomes a matter of theists arguing that 

actually, the world’s pretty great, the evil things in it are per
fectly 
justified and necessary, and everything is for the best
"""
is addressing in a nice concise way.

> Of course this leaves open the issue of how we can coherently 
> claim that God is "good" without being able to define what "good" means
, 
> but I can't see how he addresses this point.

He addresses it throughout the article. "Torturing and killing people is 

good, by definition".

> Overall I was left with the distinct impression that he was arguing 
> against straw-man versions to the resolutions to the problem of evil. 

I dunno. It seems that every rebuttal to the problem is essentially eithe
r 
"you don't realize that the Holocaust was good and not evil" or "everyone
 
tortured to death during the Holocaust deserved it."  That's what he's 
addressing, and that's what you're arguing as well.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Darren New wrote:
> Kevin Wampler wrote:
>> There's a further rather critical assumption in the article that's not 
>> explicitly stated: That the definition of "good" as it applies to God 
>> coincides with the definition of "good" as it applies to human actions.
> 
> Sure. And that's once again the "it isn't really evil, because then God 
> would be doing evil" justification.
> 
> In other words, that's exactly what
> """
> the bulk of the discussion then becomes a matter of theists arguing that 
> actually, the world’s pretty great, the evil things in it are perfectly 
> justified and necessary, and everything is for the best
> """
> is addressing in a nice concise way.

While that is a valid interpretation of what he said in that sentence, I 
don't see that the rest of his arguments addressed what I'm talking 
about, since there's a subtle distinction that he seems to be completely 
ignoring (see my next paragraph).


>> Of course this leaves open the issue of how we can coherently claim 
>> that God is "good" without being able to define what "good" means, but 
>> I can't see how he addresses this point.
> 
> He addresses it throughout the article. "Torturing and killing people is 
> good, by definition".

Not at all, see point 1) in the next paragraph.


>> Overall I was left with the distinct impression that he was arguing 
>> against straw-man versions to the resolutions to the problem of evil. 
> 
> I dunno. It seems that every rebuttal to the problem is essentially 
> either "you don't realize that the Holocaust was good and not evil" or 
> "everyone tortured to death during the Holocaust deserved it."  That's 
> what he's addressing, and that's what you're arguing as well.
> 

It's actually not what I'm arguing here.  I'll address the differences 
in turn:


1) "You don't realize that the Holocaust was good and not evil":

I'm instead pointing out that he ignores the viewpoint that might be 
most simply summed up "while the Holocaust was evil, creating a universe 
in which the holocaust could/would happen isn't necessarily".  Now, you 
could certainly attempt to make an argument against this point, but I 
don't see him doing it.

I should note, however, that such a God does come across as 
(potentially/probably) being rather unconcerned with our sufferings, but 
he bases his "moral repugnance" argument on assuming that this tell us 
something about human morality, which is not necessarily the case.


2) "Everyone tortured to death during the Holocaust deserved it.":

I don't see how "deserving it" factors into the points I was making, but 
if you think I'm actually making this argument I'd be interested to hear 
more specifically why that is.  Certainly he bases his particular 
example of this on original sin, which is not at all relevant to the 
points I was making.  I was actually quite surprised when he brought 
this up original sin as the "unifying principle" behind all the 
arguments, since that just seems to be a totally unjustified assertion 
unless you restrict yourself to very particular sorts Christian 
viewpoints (this is part of why why I see him as constructing straw-men).


Basically, I'm arguing that there's a version of the "moves in 
mysterious ways" argument which his points don't apply to.

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"Darren New" <dne### [at] sanrrcom> wrote in message
news:4aef073a$1@news.povray.org...
somebody wrote:

>> In fact, even as an atheist, I don't think the argument from evil is a
>> particularly strong one. For evil is a sliding scale.

>So you're making exactly the argument of "well, the world doesn't really
>contain evil after all," which is exactly the phrasing I found interesting
>in the article.

I'm rather claiming that the world/universe contains neither good, nor evil.
All is in our minds.

>You're doing the Descartes bit here. "In order to know good, we must know
>evil first."  I think the fact that we *can* imagine things like Event
>Horizon means we have a pretty good idea of a sliding scale of evil. What
if
>the "bad smell objectors" imagined Event Horizon and our world too.
Wouldn't
>they conclude the evil isn't all that bad?

Good point. But does that we can imagine Event Horizon mean that we can
imagine anything and everything worse? Maybe the bad smell objectors can
imagine us but not Event Horizon. And yet, imagination may not be the key. I
can imagine an 824 billion light years tall man - or rather, I may think, or
claim, that I can imagine such a thing. You can very well doubt the
legitimacy of such imagination. I can similarly doubt that
bad-smell-objectors can legitimately imagine Even Horizon, let alone us.

It's also not a matter of outwitting the system. That I have a pet model of
the character of evil doesn't mean that I should give up the concept, and
more than figuring out how pheromones works prevents scientists from falling
in love. Introspection is not, in other words, sufficient to override one's
nature.

>> I would counter that what we perceive as evil are simply foul
>> smells.

>"bulk of the discussion then becomes a matter of theists arguing that
>actually, the world's pretty great, the evil things in it are perfectly
>justified and necessary,"

Necessity of evil is a theistic angle. I don't find evil necessary - that
would be like finding gravity necessary. Gravity is not necessary, it just
is. However, I find it pretty much necessary that there will be things that
sentient beings will find evil, for senses have to differentiate between
inputs.

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somebody wrote:
> I'm rather claiming that the world/universe contains neither good, nor evil.
> All is in our minds.

Well, yes. But then that's ignoring the premise of what you're arguing against.

> Good point. But does that we can imagine Event Horizon mean that we can
> imagine anything and everything worse? 

I think it's that because we can imagine something better, we know there's 
unnecessary evil. What benefit is encephalitis? Do you really think there's 
nothing bad in the world that you can't imagine the world being just as good 
if it were missing?  You don't think a world without polio and smallpox is 
better than a world with polio and smallpox?

> Necessity of evil is a theistic angle. 

Right. And the article I posted explained why that is, in a way I'd not 
heard it so elegantly put.

> However, I find it pretty much necessary that there will be things that
> sentient beings will find evil, for senses have to differentiate between
> inputs.

Sure. But that's not playing the game. :-) The game starts by assuming a 
benevolent omnipotent being interested in whether there is good and evil in 
the world. Simply disclaiming there is no such thing as evil is stepping 
outside the system, which doesn't work with faithful people.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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"Kevin Wampler" <wam### [at] uwashingtonedu> wrote in message
news:4aef81b4$1@news.povray.org...
> Darren New wrote:
> >> But there's an extra, assumed step:
> >> 1b) God is good.
> >
> > Well, it's not assumed by the article in the link. It's explicitly
> > stated. Obviously the same logic doesn't hold for Satan or Zeus, for
> > example.
>
>
> There's a further rather critical assumption in the article that's not
> explicitly stated: That the definition of "good" as it applies to God
> coincides with the definition of "good" as it applies to human actions.

Indeed, there's the epistemological issues. As a kid, many of us might have
thought being forced, and sometimes tricked, into eating broccoli was
torture, and hence an evil act. The understanding changes with access to
higher knowledge, a wider perspective. Who's to say that the gap in
understanding between god and man is less than that of a toddler and a grown
up?

That said, a religion with a god or gods whose concept of good and evil are
as alien to us as a toddler's is to a grown ups, won't be either comforting
or convincing. So in the end, religions necessarily are hazy themselves on
the concepts of good and evil.

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"Tim Cook" <z99### [at] gmailcom> wrote in message
news:4aef1842@news.povray.org...
> Captain Jack wrote:

> > A candle is brighter than nothing.
> > Nothing is brighter than the sun.
> > Therefore, a candle is brighter than the sun.

> I prefer the form:
> A ham sandwich is better than nothing.
> Nothing is better than eternal happiness.
> Therefore, a ham sandwich is better than eternal happiness.

Amphibology?

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Kevin Wampler wrote:
> 1) "You don't realize that the Holocaust was good and not evil":
> 
> I'm instead pointing out that he ignores the viewpoint that might be 
> most simply summed up "while the Holocaust was evil, creating a universe 
> in which the holocaust could/would happen isn't necessarily".  Now, you 
> could certainly attempt to make an argument against this point, but I 
> don't see him doing it.

"the evil things in it are perfectly justified and necessary,"

You're saying "maybe the world would be more evil without the holocaust, you 
just can't tell."  That's *exactly* the argument he's talking about.

> 2) "Everyone tortured to death during the Holocaust deserved it.":
> 
> I don't see how "deserving it" factors into the points I was making, but 
> if you think I'm actually making this argument I'd be interested to hear 
> more specifically why that is. 

No, I was saying that he's saying that's the other usual argument. Either 
God causes the holocaust because preventing it would be more evil, or the 
holocaust happened because of Free Will, meaning that the evil came because 
you wanted it. Factor in some Original Sin there.

> Basically, I'm arguing that there's a version of the "moves in 
> mysterious ways" argument which his points don't apply to.

"the evil things in it are perfectly justified and necessary, and everything 
is for the best"

What mysterious ways are you talking about? That maybe God's idea of good 
doesn't match ours? Then he'd do evil by our definitions. That's saying that 
polio is actually good, and we just don't realize it, and the reason it's 
good is because God does it and God is by definition good.  Otherwise, I'm 
not seeing what you're trying to say. Maybe I'm just dense today.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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somebody wrote:
> Indeed, there's the epistemological issues. As a kid, many of us might have
> thought being forced, and sometimes tricked, into eating broccoli was
> torture, and hence an evil act. 

I think that this is a bogus argument, basically because it's trivial to 
imagine a world where all the things that taste good are the ones that are 
good for you. Being forced to eat broccoli seems like evil because it *is* 
evil - it's bad that healthy stuff tastes awful. Indeed, it's bad that there 
even is such a thing as unhealthy food.

This is the "it's good for you to suffer" argument, which is a subset of the 
"it isn't really evil after all" argument that I found clearly described.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Kevin Wampler wrote:
> I'm instead pointing out that he ignores the viewpoint that might be 
> most simply summed up "while the Holocaust was evil, creating a universe 
> in which the holocaust could/would happen isn't necessarily".  Now, you 
> could certainly attempt to make an argument against this point, but I 
> don't see him doing it.

Oh, I see what you mean.  I'll have to think about this more.  It's kind of 
late here. :-)

> Basically, I'm arguing that there's a version of the "moves in 
> mysterious ways" argument which his points don't apply to.

Yes, I grok now, after rereading a few times.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Darren New wrote:
> You're saying "maybe the world would be more evil without the holocaust, 
> you just can't tell."  That's *exactly* the argument he's talking about.
> 
> ...
> 
> "the evil things in it are perfectly justified and necessary, and 
> everything is for the best"
> 
> What mysterious ways are you talking about? That maybe God's idea of 
> good doesn't match ours? Then he'd do evil by our definitions. That's 
> saying that polio is actually good, and we just don't realize it

NOTE: just saw your other response, but I'd already gone and typed this 
all out so I may as well post it.  If what you'd groked from my posts 
contradicts what I've written below I'd certainly be interested in 
hearing the argument that you thought I was making (maybe it's a better 
argument!)

---

I think this is what he doesn't address properly.  What he musters is this:

"Of course, one of the consequences of this is then that we are also too 
cognitively limited to understand what’s right and wrong"

This, unfortunately, doesn't follow from the point I'm making.  What 
would follow is that we're too cognitively limited to understand what's 
right and wrong for *God*, but it's perfectly consistent to believe that 
doesn't at all preclude us from understand what's right and wrong for 
humans.

Now, I realize that this may come across as "well maybe God wanted us to 
get polio", but that's not the view I'm talking about.  Rather it's the 
view that God's decisions would be made at a scale so much larger than 
ours that there might well be reasons (possibly beyond our 
comprehension) which make a universe which allows such things a "good" 
thing.  One might even say this would be expected considering the 
immeasurably vast scale on which God would be making decisions.

What this particular line of reasoning *would* entail, however, is that 
the concept of good as it applies to God sure doesn't seem to involve 
minimizing our earthly suffering as it's primary factor -- but I don't 
see how this is inconsistent or how it diminishes/undermines moral 
choice as we typically understand it on our human level (the latter of 
which seems to be his overall point).


> Otherwise, I'm not seeing what you're trying to say. Maybe I'm 
> just dense today.

I suppose I'd say that my point is that one could take the view that our 
earthly suffering simply isn't the primary factor in the decisions made 
by God, and that this doesn't preclude that there may be many ways in 
which such a God could be "good".

His argument, on the other hand, seems to be implicitly using the 
assumption that God is chose how to make the universe with the reduction 
of earthly human suffering as the primary moral factor.  This makes 
perfect sense in rebutting certain religious arguments, but he phrases 
his initial problem more generally than that, and I don't his reasoning 
carries over to the viewpoint I mention.

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somebody wrote:
> Good point. But does that we can imagine Event Horizon mean that we can
> imagine anything and everything worse? Maybe the bad smell objectors can
> imagine us but not Event Horizon. And yet, imagination may not be the key. I
> can imagine an 824 billion light years tall man - or rather, I may think, or
> claim, that I can imagine such a thing. You can very well doubt the
> legitimacy of such imagination. I can similarly doubt that
> bad-smell-objectors can legitimately imagine Even Horizon, let alone us.

Tangental to that, on the topic of imagination.  The brain-in-vat thing 
is shot down by the idea that, if we *were*, we'd be unable to conceive 
of the notion of a brain-in-a-vat.  But doesn't that totally disregard 
imagination?  We can imagine things that we have no experience of, and 
assign form to things that may or may not even be able to exist.

> Necessity of evil is a theistic angle. I don't find evil necessary - that
> would be like finding gravity necessary. Gravity is not necessary, it just
> is. However, I find it pretty much necessary that there will be things that
> sentient beings will find evil, for senses have to differentiate between
> inputs.

Gravity might well be necessary, once we discover what the heck it IS.

--
Tim Cook
http://empyrean.freesitespace.net

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Darren New wrote:
> I think that this is a bogus argument, basically because it's trivial to 
> imagine a world where all the things that taste good are the ones that 
> are good for you. Being forced to eat broccoli seems like evil because 
> it *is* evil - it's bad that healthy stuff tastes awful. Indeed, it's 
> bad that there even is such a thing as unhealthy food.

I never had a problem with eating broccoli.  And the first time I tried 
brussels sprouts when I was a kid, I was greatly confused at their 
infamy, as I found them rather tasty.

--
Tim Cook
http://empyrean.freesitespace.net

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Tim Cook wrote:
> Tangental to that, on the topic of imagination.  The brain-in-vat thing 
> is shot down by the idea that, if we *were*, we'd be unable to conceive 
> of the notion of a brain-in-a-vat. 

I can't imagine why that would be the case. No, if we're all computer 
simulations, you could argue that the simulation might be programmed to 
prevent us from noticing it's a simulation. But an evolved brain in a vat?

> Gravity might well be necessary, once we discover what the heck it IS.

I think the whole concept of "necessary" conflicts with the concept of 
"omnipotence."

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Kevin Wampler wrote:
> "Of course, one of the consequences of this is then that we are also to
o 
> cognitively limited to understand what’s right and wrong"
> 
> This, unfortunately, doesn't follow from the point I'm making.  What 
> would follow is that we're too cognitively limited to understand what's
 
> right and wrong for *God*, but it's perfectly consistent to believe tha
t 
> doesn't at all preclude us from understand what's right and wrong for 
> humans.

I think the idea that there are different kinds of good and evil is at od
ds 
with the concept that doing what God wants is good. You're still using th
e 
"god moves in mysterious ways" argument, that we cannot understand what 
"good" is. You're just modifying it by saying "we can understand human go
od, 
but not god good." For most christians and muslims, I think the idea that
 
god's goodness is inferior to human goodness is bogus. The idea that ther
e 
are things that humans can do that's good that God would think is evil or
 
vice versa doesn't fly. Perhaps he didn't state that explicitly.

But as soon as you start putting in relativistic goodness rather than 
absolute goodness, where something that's good for me is bad for you, the
n 
the whole "do what God says" justification goes out the window.

> Now, I realize that this may come across as "well maybe God wanted us t
o 
> get polio", but that's not the view I'm talking about.  Rather it's the
 
> view that God's decisions would be made at a scale so much larger than 

> ours that there might well be reasons (possibly beyond our 
> comprehension) which make a universe which allows such things a "good" 

> thing.  One might even say this would be expected considering the 
> immeasurably vast scale on which God would be making decisions.

Sure. That's the "free will" argument. God allows evil because disallowin
g 
people being evil to each other would reduce their "free will" to commit 
evil.

I don't think you're going to find many full-blown step-by-step explanati
ons 
on the topic, because it has already been beaten to death for the last 30
00 
years.

> What this particular line of reasoning *would* entail, however, is that
 
> the concept of good as it applies to God sure doesn't seem to involve 
> minimizing our earthly suffering as it's primary factor

I think that's what he's talking about in the second half. If by definiti
on 
God is good, and goodness doesn't involve minimizing suffering, then bein
g 
tortured and killed is good.

>> Otherwise, I'm not seeing what you're trying to say. Maybe I'm just 
>> dense today.
> 
> I suppose I'd say that my point is that one could take the view that ou
r 
> earthly suffering simply isn't the primary factor in the decisions made
 
> by God, and that this doesn't preclude that there may be many ways in 
> which such a God could be "good".

Well, the christian God is supposed to be a personal god. The Islamic god
 is 
in control of every aspect of life, as I understand it.

This certainly works if God is either not omnipotent or doesn't really ca
re 
about people. But then you wind up with gods like Zeus.

> His argument, on the other hand, seems to be implicitly using the 
> assumption that God is chose how to make the universe with the reductio
n 
> of earthly human suffering as the primary moral factor. 

I don't think so. His assumption is "God is good and omnipotent" plus "ev
il 
exists". So you're either saying "human suffering isn't evil" or "God isn
't 
omnipotent enough to make a world with less evil than it now contains."

If you start with the assumption that God's idea of "good" doesn't match 

ours, then you're ignoring the "God is good" assumption, which of course 
has 
to read as an absolute. Otherwise you have no moral standing to tell peop
le 
what God wants them to do.

Anyway, what I thought you were saying is along the lines of "it's good t
o 
discover the secrets of how atoms work", and "it's evil to use that to bl
ow 
up cities". Just because the holocaust happened doesn't mean it's inheren
tly 
evil to create a world in which the holocaust can happen.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Darren New wrote:
> I think the whole concept of "necessary" conflicts with the concept of 
> "omnipotence."

Why?  As a supposition:  gravity is necessary as the mechanism by which 
mass affects things, which does not preclude God being aware of all 
properties of all particles and fields in existence.

The Heisenberg uncertainty principle, however, *does* preclude omnipotence.

--
Tim Cook
http://empyrean.freesitespace.net

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Tim Cook wrote:
> Darren New wrote:
>> I think the whole concept of "necessary" conflicts with the concept of 
>> "omnipotence."
> 
> Why?  As a supposition:  gravity is necessary as the mechanism by which 
> mass affects things, which does not preclude God being aware of all 
> properties of all particles and fields in existence.

You're confusing omniscience with omnipotence.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

Post a reply to this message

Darren New wrote:
> I think the idea that there are different kinds of good and evil is at 
> odds with the concept that doing what God wants is good. You're still 
> using the "god moves in mysterious ways" argument, that we cannot 
> understand what "good" is. You're just modifying it by saying "we can 
> understand human good, but not god good." For most christians and 
> muslims, I think the idea that god's goodness is inferior to human 
> goodness is bogus. The idea that there are things that humans can do 
> that's good that God would think is evil or vice versa doesn't fly. 
> Perhaps he didn't state that explicitly.
> 
> But as soon as you start putting in relativistic goodness rather than 
> absolute goodness, where something that's good for me is bad for you, 
> then the whole "do what God says" justification goes out the window.

I suspect they might be more amenable to the concept that God's "good" 
is superior (rather than inferior) to the human version.  Theoretically 
  it could also be the case that the underlying concepts are the same 
but that God's decisions are so vast that we can't comprehend how the 
same principles are are work.

Nevertheless, I should make clear that I wasn't talking about 
"mainstream" Christian/Muslim viewpoints.  Perhaps the author was, and 
by beef is really that he didn't make that more clear.


> Sure. That's the "free will" argument. God allows evil because 
> disallowing people being evil to each other would reduce their "free 
> will" to commit evil.

Free will is one scenario which would fit under such an explanation, but 
one could probably imagine others as well.


> Well, the christian God is supposed to be a personal god. The Islamic 
> god is in control of every aspect of life, as I understand it.
> 
> This certainly works if God is either not omnipotent or doesn't really 
> care about people. But then you wind up with gods like Zeus.

You could make the view work with a personal God by assuming that all 
our earthly suffering end up being for the better (or unimportant) once 
you consider the afterlife (not a traditional view, I'm aware, but I 
think it's consistent).


> If you start with the assumption that God's idea of "good" doesn't match 
> ours, then you're ignoring the "God is good" assumption, which of course 
> has to read as an absolute. Otherwise you have no moral standing to tell 
> people what God wants them to do.

Oh yes, certainly.  Under this view it's much tricker to make claims 
about what God wants us to do, although I still think it's possible. 
For instance, once could assume that morality is based on intent rather 
than action.  Then we could still know what's good, and this would 
coincide with what God thinks is good.  The difference is that we would 
have no reason to think that we would actually *do* what God would have 
done, but rather that what's important is that we did it for noble reasons.

Under this view the apparent existence of evil (assuming omnipotence) 
would be because God's considerations is creating the universe are far 
removed from our day-to-day sufferings (surely a plausible assumption). 
  Again, I agree that you'd need more work to fit this into a standard 
Christian view, but I suspect it's fully possible.


> Anyway, what I thought you were saying is along the lines of "it's good 
> to discover the secrets of how atoms work", and "it's evil to use that 
> to blow up cities". Just because the holocaust happened doesn't mean 
> it's inherently evil to create a world in which the holocaust can happen.

I was also making this point, which one would classify under the 
umbrella of "God has the same morality, but makes decisions at a 
different scale".

I think the main problem is that I took him to be arguing against 
problem of evil rebuttals in the abstract, philosophical sense, whereas 
he seems to be making a point only about particular sorts of theistic 
views in which you have a relatively personal God and in which our time 
on Earth really does matter (as opposed to the afterlife being the man 
deal).  Certainly many people have exactly these views, but since I'd 
assumed he was making a broader argument his insistence on attacking 
that one section seemed like a "straw man" argument to me.

Post a reply to this message

Kevin Wampler wrote:
> I suspect they might be more amenable to the concept that God's "good" 
> is superior (rather than inferior) to the human version. 

And what exactly does that mean?  That there are things God thinks are good 
that we think are evil?  That there are things we think are good that God 
thinks are evil? Both?

If God thinks things are good that we think are evil, then God isn't 
benevolent. After all, Hitler thought he was improving the race, so *he* 
didn't think it was evil.

If God thinks things are evil that we think are good, then God's will is 
that we do evil (as far as we know) things, which pretty much sums up the 
"you deserve to be tortured" bit.

> Theoretically 
>  it could also be the case that the underlying concepts are the same but 
> that God's decisions are so vast that we can't comprehend how the same 
> principles are are work.

In other words, "God really is good, but he's so mysterious that we can't 
tell that."  In other words, "the evil you see isn't really evil, but it's 
really good, because God willed it and God is good, even though we don't 
have any evidence supporting that in his behavior."

> Nevertheless, I should make clear that I wasn't talking about 
> "mainstream" Christian/Muslim viewpoints.  Perhaps the author was, and 
> by beef is really that he didn't make that more clear.

I think it's clear he's talking about a God who actually cares, yes.

> You could make the view work with a personal God by assuming that all 
> our earthly suffering end up being for the better (or unimportant) once 
> you consider the afterlife (not a traditional view, I'm aware, but I 
> think it's consistent).

And I think that falls under the "it's not really evil after all" argument. 
Neither polio and the holocaust are really bad, ya see, because otherwise 
God would be allowing bad things.

> Oh yes, certainly.  Under this view it's much tricker to make claims 
> about what God wants us to do, although I still think it's possible. For 
> instance, once could assume that morality is based on intent rather than 
> action.  Then we could still know what's good, and this would coincide 
> with what God thinks is good.  The difference is that we would have no 
> reason to think that we would actually *do* what God would have done, 
> but rather that what's important is that we did it for noble reasons.

Makes sense, but conflicts with people who want to tell you what to do 
because their God said so.

> Certainly many people have exactly these views, but since I'd 
> assumed he was making a broader argument his insistence on attacking 
> that one section seemed like a "straw man" argument to me.

Fair nuff.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Darren New wrote:
> You're confusing omniscience with omnipotence.

Er.  Ah, that too.

But does omnipotence mean you must exert all forces yourself, or only 
that you are able to do so?  Can an omnipotent being create a mechanism 
to do a subset of their work for them, or are they obligated to always 
do all work at all times?

--
Tim Cook
http://empyrean.freesitespace.net

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Tim Cook wrote:
> Darren New wrote:
>> You're confusing omniscience with omnipotence.
> 
> Er.  Ah, that too.
> 
> But does omnipotence mean you must exert all forces yourself, or only 
> that you are able to do so?  Can an omnipotent being create a mechanism 
> to do a subset of their work for them, or are they obligated to always 
> do all work at all times?

I don't think it matters, if you assert that an omnipotent being can have/do 
anything he wants. If he doesn't want evil, he just makes it such that there 
is no evil.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Darren New wrote:
> Kevin Wampler wrote:
>> "Of course, one of the consequences of this is then that we are also 
>> too cognitively limited to understand what’s right and wrong"
>>
>> This, unfortunately, doesn't follow from the point I'm making.  What 
>> would follow is that we're too cognitively limited to understand 
>> what's right and wrong for *God*, but it's perfectly consistent to 
>> believe that doesn't at all preclude us from understand what's right 
>> and wrong for humans.
> 
Sigh.. Are we seriously rehashing a more than 2,000 year old argument 
that Aristotle solve with, "I don't know, but the gods certainly don't 
seem to have a clue either.", and Plato later "fixed" by stating, "Yeah, 
well.. Even if the gods don't know, its real anyway, so must be like 
some sort of thing that just exists, which permeates everything, so 
those paying attention can figure it out." Both views are based on 
*ignorance*, but the later one at least has the value of a) not positing 
that a god has to make all of it up, or, even more absurd, that any of 
the gods we have invented describe that god in the slightest, and b) it 
would provide an explanation, if such a bloody thing was needed, for why 
everything from Corvids, like Ravens and Crows manage to have bird 
funerals, or a sort, to other primates, showing the capacity to let 
themselves lose, to help a friend win.

It does present a problem though for people suggesting a god doing it. 
Why bother making it so damn common, yet so inconsistent, and seemingly 
bound *entirely* to the level of social interaction, cooperation and 
mutual trust a species needs to survive, almost like an "adaptive 
trait"? If, as a god, you could have made it bloody clearer that it was 
put there divinely, that good and evil are real concepts, not just 
general vague, "everything that my species doesn't like is evil, while 
all the stuff that makes me feel nice I'll call good.", why make it 
indistinguishable from something which that happened by necessity, not plan?

Its like the latest two Mr. Diety movies. One a angelic PZ convinces god 
that its a lot of work to make everything in 6 days, but there is this 
algorithm that will take a lot longer, will generate species with all 
the same half assed mistakes that the deity planned to use anyway, being 
lazy, it would just take a lot longer, but he would get all the credit 
anyway. The next one was him talking to his son, trying to work out the 
whole original sin, trinity, salvation thing, to which the result was, 
"So, I am sacrificing myself, who is me, to myself, who is you, to pay 
for a sin that never happened, because we used PZed's molecular machine 
thing, instead of the 6 day creation, so no original sin was ever 
committed?"

Basically, ridiculous, since it requires ignoring all the stuff that 
implies that a god just simply *unnecessary* to come up with it in the 
first place, and assuming that a god came up with it, because, well.. 
there just happened to be one, that's why! Think nearly the same 
argument is going on over at a news paper site, sort of. Some clown is 
using the same arguments in a book, to suggest the afterlife is real, 
and, as usual, you get the bozos defending the idea showing up and 
saying, "It doesn't matter if Einstein **specifically** and **clearly** 
stated that he didn't believe in a god, so and so says he did, in such 
and such book, I Googled it damn it, it must be right!", in their own 
defense of, "See, smart people believed it, just like all the dumb ones 
did, so argmentum populum, is *must* be so!"

There is nothing insightful (to who ever started this mess) about any of 
it, unless you simply haven't seen the argument before. Just as there 
are lots of people claiming that there is some "deep" theological ideas 
underpinning modern theology, point to a bunch of scholars that are 
supposedly making them, then, invariably, when those people are asked 
what the "deep" issues are, they trot out the top 10 list of overused, 
constantly rebutted, and/or just fallacious, arguments everyone else 
uses. Its like listening to someone tell you that his shirt isn't red, 
saying it is, being replied to that, no, its not red-red, but special 
red, just as so and so, only to, when asking them, get the same, "No, 
its not red at all.", argument. Not only are the arguments used in 
religion all circular, their supporting authorities are moebius shaped, 
with one referring to the next, who refers to the next, who refers to 
the first one, none of them making any different arguments, or offering 
better evidence, just an infinite regression of CC: tags.

-- 
void main () {
   If Schrödingers_cat is alive or version > 98 {
     if version = "Vista" {
       call slow_by_half();
       call DRM_everything();
     }
     call functional_code();
   }
   else
     call crash_windows();
}

<A HREF='http://www.daz3d.com/index.php?refid=16130551'>Get 3D Models, 
3D Content, and 3D Software at DAZ3D!</A>

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Patrick Elliott wrote:
> Its like listening to someone tell you that his shirt isn't red, 
> saying it is, being replied to that, no, its not red-red, but special 
> red, just as so and so, only to, when asking them, get the same, "No, 
> its not red at all.", argument.

BTW. Letters that go missing = evil. lol

'just as*k* so and so'


-- 
void main () {
   If Schrödingers_cat is alive or version > 98 {
     if version = "Vista" {
       call slow_by_half();
       call DRM_everything();
     }
     call functional_code();
   }
   else
     call crash_windows();
}

<A HREF='http://www.daz3d.com/index.php?refid=16130551'>Get 3D Models, 
3D Content, and 3D Software at DAZ3D!</A>

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"Darren New" <dne### [at] sanrrcom> wrote in message
news:4aefbee6$1@news.povray.org...
> somebody wrote:

> > Indeed, there's the epistemological issues. As a kid, many of us might
have
> > thought being forced, and sometimes tricked, into eating broccoli was
> > torture, and hence an evil act.

> I think that this is a bogus argument, basically because it's trivial to
> imagine a world where all the things that taste good are the ones that are
> good for you.

Yes but it's also trivial for a kid to imagine a world where everything is
sugar coated chocolate. He doesn't know the difference between bad food and
good for and doesn't care. If he did, he'd imagine a world where nutrional
food tastes good (like you do), instead of making chocolate only food. You
know about nutrition, so you are one level above the kid, but maybe there
are things that you (we) do not know, that make our imagination just as
naive to someone at a higher level of understanding.

> Being forced to eat broccoli seems like evil because it *is*
> evil - it's bad that healthy stuff tastes awful. Indeed, it's bad that
there
> even is such a thing as unhealthy food.
>
> This is the "it's good for you to suffer" argument, which is a subset of
the
> "it isn't really evil after all" argument that I found clearly described.

I'm not saying evil is good for you. But I don't buy the argument that
"since I could imagine a better world, there's evil in this one" argument.
First, imagining is not the same as realizing (incidentally, that's where
Anselm's ontological argument fails, but that's a different matter). Second,
"better" for who? I can imagine a universe where I'm god and everyone
worships me. Certainly, it's better for me than the present one. You are
inherently making a selfish claim if you say the world you can imagine,
however good and fair you believe it to be, is better than the real one or
one that somebody else imagines. By thinking that elimination of pain is a
universally good thing, for instance, are we not saying that maschists do
not count?

Post a reply to this message

somebody wrote:
> I'm not saying evil is good for you. But I don't buy the argument that
> "since I could imagine a better world, there's evil in this one" argument.

I think this is going back to the "no, we're not just talking about minor 
imperfections" in the original article. Are you really claiming there isn't 
anything bad or evil in the world?

> First, imagining is not the same as realizing

Omnipotence.

> "better" for who? 

I can easily imagine worlds that are better for everyone. I don't think too 
many people objected to the eradication of polio or smallpox. I think pretty 
much everyone is hoping HIV doesn't mutate into a airborne zombie-creating 
supervirus. Neither the driver nor the pedestrian is benefited by a head 
going thru the windshield.

Maybe there are a few "insane" people who want to die of polio. However, it 
would seem to be a better good to cure them of their insanity than to give 
them polio.

In any case, I think this is pretty well addressed in the original article too.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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"Darren New" <dne### [at] sanrrcom> wrote in message
news:4af1a18f$1@news.povray.org...
> somebody wrote:

> > I'm not saying evil is good for you. But I don't buy the argument that
> > "since I could imagine a better world, there's evil in this one"
argument.

> I think this is going back to the "no, we're not just talking about minor
> imperfections" in the original article. Are you really claiming there
isn't
> anything bad or evil in the world?

Sure there is - as far as I am concerned. But that only proves that the
universe does not cater to my needs or whims. While I can imagine better
universes from my pov, I cannot claim that it's universally (no pun
intended) and objectively better.

> > First, imagining is not the same as realizing

> Omnipotence.

Not even. I mentioned earlier at one point; I can imagine a man that's 400
billion light years tall. I can imagine a universe with 172 spatial
dimensions. But really, all I am doing is describing a single attribute in
rather abstract terms. Language allows us that much, but I don't think such
imagination counts as understanding by, well, any stretch of imagination.

> > "better" for who?

> I can easily imagine worlds that are better for everyone. I don't think
too
> many people objected to the eradication of polio or smallpox. I think
pretty
> much everyone is hoping HIV doesn't mutate into a airborne zombie-creating
> supervirus. Neither the driver nor the pedestrian is benefited by a head
> going thru the windshield.

Doctors, medical researchers, airbag and seatbelt makers probably benefit.
</cynical, tongue in cheek>

> Maybe there are a few "insane" people who want to die of polio. However,
it
> would seem to be a better good to cure them of their insanity than to give
> them polio.

You'd be taking away some groundbreaking art from humanity's collective
should all insanity be cured.

Now, what about the other side of things? In a perfect (limit of bettering)
universe, it's not enough to eliminate evil or bad, but good needs to be
maximized. Then the question becomes, is there a limit to good? How many
Bach's should a truly benevolent God give to his people? One, ten, a
million? I don't think any number is enough. For any perfection witheld from
sentient beings by an omnipotent being is itself an evil act. That's after
all, why one would think death is evil. In fact, an omnipotent god who fails
to bestow omnipotence, omniscience and omni-anything to his creations is
evil, is it not?

Hence the problem with imagination. It's easy to say that eliminating death
and suffering would eliminate evil. But it's not death itself, lack of
eternal life that's evil. That is, evil is in the lack of things, abilities.
If you give me eternal life, I'll find ten things that I lack, ten faults I
find with the universe. Give me those ten, and I'll come up with ten
thousand. Hence "just don't let anybody suffer" does not look like a
workable model to me. Much like a kid dreaming of a world where chocolate is
the only food, or me "imagining" a 172 dimensional universe.

Post a reply to this message

somebody wrote:
> Sure there is - as far as I am concerned. But that only proves that the
> universe does not cater to my needs or whims. 

Well, yes, but that's the point being made, yes?

>>> First, imagining is not the same as realizing
>> Omnipotence.
> 
> Not even. I mentioned earlier at one point; I can imagine a man that's 400
> billion light years tall. 

I'm not sure what you're trying to say here.

> Doctors, medical researchers, airbag and seatbelt makers probably benefit.
> </cynical, tongue in cheek>

I imagine almost all doctors would be quite happy if everyone was suddenly 
totally healthy.

>> Maybe there are a few "insane" people who want to die of polio. However,
> it
>> would seem to be a better good to cure them of their insanity than to give
>> them polio.
> 
> You'd be taking away some groundbreaking art from humanity's collective
> should all insanity be cured.

That's why "insane" is in quotes.

> Now, what about the other side of things? In a perfect (limit of bettering)
> universe, it's not enough to eliminate evil or bad, but good needs to be
> maximized. Then the question becomes, is there a limit to good? How many
> Bach's should a truly benevolent God give to his people? One, ten, a
> million? I don't think any number is enough. For any perfection witheld from
> sentient beings by an omnipotent being is itself an evil act. That's after
> all, why one would think death is evil. In fact, an omnipotent god who fails
> to bestow omnipotence, omniscience and omni-anything to his creations is
> evil, is it not?

I would think so. But that's, after all, the point. :-)

> Hence the problem with imagination. It's easy to say that eliminating death
> and suffering would eliminate evil. But it's not death itself, lack of
> eternal life that's evil. That is, evil is in the lack of things, abilities.
> If you give me eternal life, I'll find ten things that I lack, ten faults I
> find with the universe. Give me those ten, and I'll come up with ten
> thousand. Hence "just don't let anybody suffer" does not look like a
> workable model to me. Much like a kid dreaming of a world where chocolate is
> the only food, or me "imagining" a 172 dimensional universe.

OK. I am pretty sure I don't know where this conversation went now.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Darren New wrote:
>
http://directionlessbones.wordpress.com/2009/10/31/challenge-suggest-a-more-evil-principle-than-this-one/


I reject the first premise on the grounds of lack of evidence.

Regards,
John

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