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Took me a while to get around to checking back in here. Not that anyone was
probably wondering/caring, but I'm still around. Guy I was renting from got
arrested for CP posession on 17 Jun, my computers got hauled in along with
his. No idea if/when I'll get my stuff back.
*sigh*
How 'bout them there Cubbies? :P
- Tim Cook
http://empyrean.freesitespace.net
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Tim Cook <z99### [at] gmail com> wrote:
> Took me a while to get around to checking back in here. Not that anyone was
> probably wondering/caring, but I'm still around. Guy I was renting from got
> arrested for CP posession on 17 Jun, my computers got hauled in along with
> his. No idea if/when I'll get my stuff back.
I will never understand the obsession the police has with confiscating
computer equipment. It's never enough to catch the suspect and stop what
he is doing (or suspected to be doing), the computer *always* has to be
confiscated if it had anything to do with the suspected crime, regardless
of whether that makes the least amount of sense or not.
Like this teenager chatting online with his xbox, and I don't remember
exactly what the chat was about, maybe something about bomb threats or
whatever, and the police goes and takes the kid for questioning and
confiscates his xbox. Now, mind you, the program/game he was using does
not log any conversations anywhere. The xbox was in no way any kind of
evidence. It's like if you made a threatening phone call, via a landline
phone, to someone and they confiscated your phone. It makes no sense.
Or how about the Pirate Bay fiasco in Sweden. The Swedish police raided
the Pirate Bay servers and confiscated all of them. You know, because it
was not enough to stop what they were doing. Because of the obsession of
the police, they had to physically confiscate the server hardware and
remove it from their location. Without even asking if maybe, just maybe
those servers might have been used by someone else.
And it resulted that the servers *were* used by someone else. A dozen
or so companies which used them as their main website and development
servers. The confiscation costed them quite sizeable amounts of money
in lost revenue and work hours because suddenly all their websites and
development servers were inaccessible. Physically removed from where
they were.
These companies sued the Swedish government for this.
The irony? Pirate Bay was *not* convicted, and they are still doing what
they did before, completely unhindered. Because of the obsession the police
has with confiscating everything, the Swedish government had to pay to the
companies which lost money because of it.
--
- Warp
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Warp wrote:
> I will never understand the obsession the police has with confiscating
> computer equipment.
It's even worse in the USA. The wise government has decided that if
you're dealing drugs, it's often difficult to prove it, so what they do
instead of trying to arrest you is they arrest your money, your cars,
your house, etc. Since your money isn't guaranteed a lawyer, you have
to sue the government and prove you're innocent to get your stuff back.
If you don't the police get to keep it.
Funny enough, in the states where the law says the police give all those
confiscated assets to (for example) the school system instead of
themselves, the number of abuses of the practice is far lower. </sarcasm>
--
Darren New / San Diego, CA, USA (PST)
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I don't even mind *too* much if they keep the hardware...that can be
replaced. But stuff like my financial records I really could use back.
Now, as an obsessive image hoarder, I a) understand that it'll take them a
while to sift through over 200,000 images and over a month's worth of video,
no matter how neatly organized and b) worry that, since I sometimes
batch-downloaded from newsgroups and image boards without necessarily
actually viewing them all, might end up having something problematic.
(Though its been long enough that I presume they'd've already come get me if
I did have something major.)
Plus I have stuff like live-action Sailor Moon, PreCure, and Ebichu that it
wouldn't surprise me if they arrested me after watching, simply on
principle. :P
That or I get them addicted to anime.
--
Tim Cook
http://empyrean.freesitespace.net
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On Sun, 12 Oct 2008 10:26:32 -0400, Tim Cook wrote:
> How 'bout them there Cubbies?
It's a pity they fell apart in the series; I actually unexpectedly got to
go to game 2 of the series against the LAD (I was in town and a friend of
a friend is a season ticket holder, and wasn't able to go). Z pitched a
good game in game 2, but the fielding was *terrible*, especially in the
2nd inning (which really was the end of the game).
Jim
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Tim Cook <z99### [at] gmailcom> wrote:
> Now, as an obsessive image hoarder, I a) understand that it'll take them a
> while to sift through over 200,000 images and over a month's worth of video,
> no matter how neatly organized and b) worry that, since I sometimes
> batch-downloaded from newsgroups and image boards without necessarily
> actually viewing them all, might end up having something problematic.
Especially given that the *exact* same image can be completely normal and
legal when it's a photograph in a family album, but illegal and sick when
it's a jpeg in the computer of a lonely man.
I would be surprised if the laws of any country made that kind of
distinction, but who cares? At least not law enforcement.
--
- Warp
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Tim Cook wrote:
> I don't even mind *too* much if they keep the hardware...that can be
> replaced. But stuff like my financial records I really could use back.
Um, isn't that what backups are for?
> (Though its been long enough that I presume they'd've
> already come get me if I did have something major.)
Isn't that what encryption is for?
Warp wrote:
> Especially given that the *exact* same image can be completely
normal and
> legal when it's a photograph in a family album, but illegal and sick when
> it's a jpeg in the computer of a lonely man.
It's OK as long as you keep it general: "I like children."
It's when you get specific that you get in trouble: "I like 12-year olds."
:-)
--
Darren New / San Diego, CA, USA (PST)
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"Darren New" <dne### [at] sanrrcom> wrote in message
news:48f29c16$1@news.povray.org...
> Um, isn't that what backups are for?
No, the warrant said 'all data storage media'. For some reason they left
what anime I'd backed up to DVD, and a spindle of various TV shows the guy I
was renting from had burned...even though they took a bunch of other stuff
that was irrelevant to their search. If they were serious about it they
should've taken all the DVDs, instead of assuming that what was on them was
what they were labelled (though it defeats the purpose of being organized to
intentionally put things where they don't belong to hide them).
As far as backups...that's what the one hard drive I had was for. They took
that too. I've taken to uploading my re-started financial records
spreadsheet to my web space...the warrany only said data storage media at
these premises. So I suppose it would've been a good idea to get one of
those off-site backup services. They didn't even ask about *that*. heh heh
heh
> Isn't that what encryption is for?
No, encryption is that big red flag that says you've got something to hide.
I do not, will not encrypt any of my data. Most I'll do is password-protect
my list-of-passwords spreadsheet.
> It's OK as long as you keep it general: "I like children."
> It's when you get specific that you get in trouble: "I like 12-year olds."
Except I hate kids. And most adults, for that matter.
--
Tim Cook
http://empyrean.freesitespace.net
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On Sun, 12 Oct 2008 23:00:48 -0400, Tim Cook wrote:
> No, encryption is that big red flag that says you've got something to
> hide. I do not, will not encrypt any of my data. Most I'll do is
> password-protect my list-of-passwords spreadsheet.
It doesn't just say you've got something to hide - it also says "I've got
something that's sensitive" - like trade secrets and other proprietary
corporate data that you want to protect in the event of theft of the
machines.
I work with data like that myself, and yes, it is encrypted.
Jim
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Tim Cook wrote:
> No, the warrant said 'all data storage media'.
I wonder if you're required to tell them where it all is. :-)
Anyway, off-site backup is good. Encrypt it, and take the disk to work
and leave it there. :-) Or put it in the safe. I'm pretty sure you're
not required to give them the password to it.
>> Isn't that what encryption is for?
>
> No, encryption is that big red flag that says you've got something to
> hide.
Um, yeah. Other company's confidential files. Your financial records.
Etc. And putting a door on your bathroom or curtains on your windows
means you have something to hide also, right? :-)
--
Darren New / San Diego, CA, USA (PST)
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Tim Cook wrote:
> No, encryption is that big red flag that says you've got something to
> hide.
Or, to phrase it differently, I take it you don't like using SSL online?
--
Darren New / San Diego, CA, USA (PST)
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"Darren New" <dne### [at] sanrrcom> wrote in message
news:48f2d461$1@news.povray.org...
> Anyway, off-site backup is good. Encrypt it, and take the disk to work and
> leave it there. :-) Or put it in the safe. I'm pretty sure you're not
> required to give them the password to it.
Actually I'm pretty sure refusing to give them my passwords would've gotten
me arrested in itself. Refusing to cooperate and all that.
> Um, yeah. Other company's confidential files. Your financial records. Etc.
> And putting a door on your bathroom or curtains on your windows means you
> have something to hide also, right? :-)
I sure do, there!
--
Tim Cook
http://empyrean.freesitespace.net
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Tim Cook wrote:
> Actually I'm pretty sure refusing to give them my passwords would've
> gotten me arrested in itself. Refusing to cooperate and all that.
Probably not in the USA. Welcome to the Fifth Amendment. You gave them
the data. You don't have to help them read it.
--
Darren New / San Diego, CA, USA (PST)
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Tim Cook wrote:
> gotten me arrested in itself.
Let me rephrase that. You might have gotten arrested. A decent lawyer
would keep you from being convicted of anything.
--
Darren New / San Diego, CA, USA (PST)
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Darren New wrote:
> Probably not in the USA. Welcome to the Fifth Amendment.
http://volokh.com/posts/1197670606.shtml
for a summary...
--
Darren New / San Diego, CA, USA (PST)
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"Tim Cook" <z99### [at] gmailcom> wrote:
> I don't even mind *too* much if they keep the hardware...that can be
> replaced. But stuff like my financial records I really could use back.
>
....
>
> Plus I have stuff like live-action Sailor Moon, PreCure, and Ebichu that it
> wouldn't surprise me if they arrested me after watching, simply on
> principle. :P
>
Once, I daydreamed about putting some of my most important files on a USB stick
and hiding it in the basement insulation, but I thought it too paranoid an idea
until now.
Wait a minute, is povray.off-topic still saving messages into perpetuity?????
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Tim Cook <z99### [at] gmailcom> wrote:
> > Isn't that what encryption is for?
> No, encryption is that big red flag that says you've got something to hide.
Well, there are rather ingenuous encrypting programs out there, such as
TrueCrypt.
It's completely impossible to see from a TrueCrypt-encrypted file that
it's an encrypted file. It just looks like random data and it's completely
impossible to *prove* that it's actually an encrypted file, even if you
knew it was. TrueCrypt puts absolutely no headers nor any other distinctive
data in the file which could be a sign that it's an encrypted file created
with it. It's just random data, period. Someone could at most suspect that
it's an encrypted file, but he has no way of proving it.
The tricks offered by TrueCrypt don't end there. You can create encrypted
files (which internally work as a file system) with a hidden portion. In
other words, the file is divided into two parts, the main part and the
hidden part, each one encrypted with a different key.
The idea is that you put your sensitive data, the one you really want
to protect, in the hidden part. In the main part you put something which
looks believably sensitive, but isn't really. You could put eg. (legal)
porn pics there or whatever, which one could believably want to encrypt.
If someone suspects that the file is an encrypted file and forces you to
give them the key, you can give them the key to the main part. They will
then decrypt the contents with that key, and they will get your porn pics
from there and that's it. The hidden part will look like empty space at
the end of the file system, and again there's absolutely no hints that
there actually is some additional data there, nor is it possible prove it
by any means. It's all random garbage.
When you want to access your data in the hidden part, you decrypt with
the second key, which will then access that hidden part rather than the
main part.
--
- Warp
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Darren New <dne### [at] sanrrcom> wrote:
> It's OK as long as you keep it general: "I like children."
If a lonely middle-aged man says that, he will get disgusted looks. ;)
--
- Warp
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On 13 Oct 2008 09:15:55 -0400, Warp <war### [at] tagpovrayorg> wrote:
> Well, there are rather ingenuous encrypting programs out there, such as
>TrueCrypt.
I just checked out the documentation on their website. TrueCrypt looks awesome. I
may have to try it out.
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Darren New wrote:
> Tim Cook wrote:
>> Actually I'm pretty sure refusing to give them my passwords would've
>> gotten me arrested in itself. Refusing to cooperate and all that.
>
> Probably not in the USA. Welcome to the Fifth Amendment. You gave them
> the data. You don't have to help them read it.
Yes, not in the US. I believe this has been tested in court. (Well, as
you pointed out, he could get arrested, but they can't charge him with
anything).
Fifth Amendment only works if you're being investigated. If, however,
they're searching your computer for evidence about someone else's crime,
I don't think you can plead the Fifth. In the US, however, I believe you
don't have to hand over the password regardless.
If Tim is in the UK (sorry, I don't follow your lives that closely<G>),
then the law does have the right to force him to hand over the password.
--
"Maybe the universe IS fuzzy." --- Hubble Telescope Scientist
/\ /\ /\ /
/ \/ \ u e e n / \/ a w a z
>>>>>>mue### [at] nawazorg<<<<<<
anl
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Warp wrote:
> Tim Cook <z99### [at] gmailcom> wrote:
>>> Isn't that what encryption is for?
>
>> No, encryption is that big red flag that says you've got something to hide.
>
> Well, there are rather ingenuous encrypting programs out there, such as
> TrueCrypt.
>
> It's completely impossible to see from a TrueCrypt-encrypted file that
> it's an encrypted file. It just looks like random data and it's completely
Well, perhaps if you're just looking at that file. If you're on Linux,
one often just has to look at your history file to see if you use the
truecrypt command.
Or they could look to see if you have truecrypt installed.
Or they could look to see if you have unmounted truecrypt directories.
I tried it and at least on my computer, truecrypt doesn't automatically
delete those directories.
I think under certain circumstances, truecrypt leaves stuff around in
the /tmp folder.
As for hidden partition, I don't know the details. I believe an
analysis was done and they only guaranteed true hiddenness if you used
FAT as the filesystem of the hidden partition. More precisely, it was
shown that if you use ext3, there will likely be data elsewhere on the
HD that will hint that there is a hidden partition somewhere.
There are other analyses. Let's say you make your "outer" TC partition
30 GB. And inside it you make your hidden partition 10 GB. I read
somewhere that TC makes that 10 GB block contiguous. So when you give
the password to your outer TC, if they look they'll see that your data
(if you have enough of it), will be all over that 30 GB except for this
big block of 10 GB which has random data (which, to the FS, appears to
be free space). Now you could say that you just deleted a 10 GB file,
explaining that big unused contiguous block, but...
--
"Maybe the universe IS fuzzy." --- Hubble Telescope Scientist
/\ /\ /\ /
/ \/ \ u e e n / \/ a w a z
>>>>>>mue### [at] nawazorg<<<<<<
anl
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Mueen Nawaz wrote:
> Fifth Amendment only works if you're being investigated. If, however,
> they're searching your computer for evidence about someone else's crime,
> I don't think you can plead the Fifth.
I am not a lawyer, but I believe this is not accurate. I remember
someone's secretary pleading the fifth when asked about her boss' stuff
and getting away with it.
The trick is, they can't really pursue *why* you are pleading the fifth,
if you follow the logic.
> In the US, however, I believe you
> don't have to hand over the password regardless.
Actually, the case is new enough that I didn't find any appeals that
would make it actual precedent, so I suspect it's still up in the air.
> If Tim is in the UK (sorry, I don't follow your lives that closely<G>),
> then the law does have the right to force him to hand over the password.
Yeah. Sucks, that. Kind of the reason we have that part of the
constitution. :-)
--
Darren New / San Diego, CA, USA (PST)
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Mueen Nawaz <m.n### [at] ieeeorg> wrote:
> Well, perhaps if you're just looking at that file. If you're on Linux,
> one often just has to look at your history file to see if you use the
> truecrypt command.
That may give them a hint that you might have encrypted files in your
system, but they have no way of knowing which ones they are. TrueCrypt
itself leaves no history anywhere.
> Or they could look to see if you have truecrypt installed.
Still doesn't prove that you have encrypted files. You could simply say
that you installed it a long time ago just to see how it works, or whatever.
> Or they could look to see if you have unmounted truecrypt directories.
> I tried it and at least on my computer, truecrypt doesn't automatically
> delete those directories.
You can choose whatever directory names you want to mount a TrueCrypt
file system. Just use /tmp/tmp/ or whatever. Nothing suspicious about that.
And as I said, TrueCrypt leaves no history anywhere about what you have
mounted or unmounted.
> I think under certain circumstances, truecrypt leaves stuff around in
> the /tmp folder.
It shouldn't leave anything if it works as advertised.
> As for hidden partition, I don't know the details. I believe an
> analysis was done and they only guaranteed true hiddenness if you used
> FAT as the filesystem of the hidden partition. More precisely, it was
> shown that if you use ext3, there will likely be data elsewhere on the
> HD that will hint that there is a hidden partition somewhere.
Then use FAT? What's the problem?
> There are other analyses. Let's say you make your "outer" TC partition
> 30 GB. And inside it you make your hidden partition 10 GB. I read
> somewhere that TC makes that 10 GB block contiguous. So when you give
> the password to your outer TC, if they look they'll see that your data
> (if you have enough of it), will be all over that 30 GB except for this
> big block of 10 GB which has random data (which, to the FS, appears to
> be free space). Now you could say that you just deleted a 10 GB file,
> explaining that big unused contiguous block, but...
AFAIK TrueCrypt puts random garbage at every free block for the precise
reason that it's impossible to tell whether it's just that, random garbage,
or a hidden partition.
--
- Warp
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"Warp" <war### [at] tagpovrayorg> wrote in message
news:48f37469@news.povray.org...
> Still doesn't prove that you have encrypted files. You could simply say
> that you installed it a long time ago just to see how it works, or
> whatever.
Ah, see, that'd be lying. I'm pretty sure I didn't have anything bad, and,
quite frankly, if I *did*, I deserve to be punished. Simple as that.
--
Tim Cook
http://empyrean.freesitespace.net
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Warp wrote:
>> I think under certain circumstances, truecrypt leaves stuff around in
>> the /tmp folder.
>
> It shouldn't leave anything if it works as advertised.
The programs you use to look at the files, however, might leave stuff in
the swap partition or in tmp files. Always a problem.
--
Darren New / San Diego, CA, USA (PST)
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Darren New <dne### [at] sanrrcom> wrote:
> Warp wrote:
> >> I think under certain circumstances, truecrypt leaves stuff around in
> >> the /tmp folder.
> >
> > It shouldn't leave anything if it works as advertised.
> The programs you use to look at the files, however, might leave stuff in
> the swap partition or in tmp files. Always a problem.
Of course there's little TrueCrypt can do about that. If you don't want
to leave any trace of what kind of files you have there, you have to be
careful about how you use them.
--
- Warp
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Tim Cook <z99### [at] gmailcom> wrote:
> "Warp" <war### [at] tagpovrayorg> wrote in message
> news:48f37469@news.povray.org...
> > Still doesn't prove that you have encrypted files. You could simply say
> > that you installed it a long time ago just to see how it works, or
> > whatever.
> Ah, see, that'd be lying.
I think that even from a moral point of view honesty does not require
you to divulge everything you do just because you are asked. There is this
thing called privacy, and people are entitled to it. What you want to hide
might not be anything illegal, but it can still be embarrassing, and nobody
should be forced to divulge anything they don't want to, not from a legal
nor from a moral point of view.
Sure, sometimes the right to privacy may be abused to hide illegal material
(eg. child porn or terrorist plans), but I still don't think that privacy
should be lifted from everybody simply because a few individuals abuse it
to hide illegal material. Nobody should be forced to reveal encryption keys
simply because they *might* be hiding something illegal. That's a very
dangerous road which we don't want to follow.
--
- Warp
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"Warp" <war### [at] tagpovrayorg> wrote in message
news:48f37469@news.povray.org...
> AFAIK TrueCrypt puts random garbage at every free block for the precise
> reason that it's impossible to tell whether it's just that, random
garbage,
> or a hidden partition.
TrueCrypt sounds exactly like the type of program FBI would write and
release, without disclosing the backdoor, of course.
Also, if the investigators fill with true random bits the sections that you
have encrypted, before turning it over, can you sue them for lost data?
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somebody <x### [at] ycom> wrote:
> TrueCrypt sounds exactly like the type of program FBI would write and
> release, without disclosing the backdoor, of course.
Except that TrueCrypt is open source. That more or less ensures that it
doesn't do anything behind the scenes.
> Also, if the investigators fill with true random bits the sections that you
> have encrypted, before turning it over, can you sue them for lost data?
But then, how do they know that they are overwriting encrypted data?
They have no way of proving that a certain file is actually encrypted
rather than containing some data used by some program.
They might as well destroy all your files. Do they perform such a
vandalism?
--
- Warp
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On Sun, 12 Oct 2008 21:53:54 -0700, Darren New wrote:
> I'm pretty sure you're not
> required to give them the password to it.
I seem to recall reading recently that there has been a challenge in the
US about the 5th amendment right to not self-incriminate and how it
applies to not being required to turn over passwords. I don't think
there's a legal precedent for it right now, but it makes sense to me (as
a non-lawyer) that that right to not incriminate oneself would extend to
not providing a password to data that might be used to incriminate you.
Jim
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On Mon, 13 Oct 2008 10:23:19 -0500, Mueen Nawaz wrote:
> If, however,
> they're searching your computer for evidence about someone else's crime,
> I don't think you can plead the Fifth.
I would think that depends on the scope of the search; ISTR that in some
cases, you could be required to turn over the password, but only after
reaching an agreement about the scope of the search only applying to data
pertaining to the crime being investigated - the data couldn't be used
for other prospective crimes.
IANAL and all that, though.
Jim
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On Mon, 13 Oct 2008 10:32:17 -0500, Mueen Nawaz wrote:
> If you're on Linux,
> one often just has to look at your history file to see if you use the
> truecrypt command.
history -c is your friend....
Jim
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On Mon, 13 Oct 2008 13:11:20 -0400, Tim Cook wrote:
> "Warp" <war### [at] tagpovrayorg> wrote in message
> news:48f37469@news.povray.org...
>> Still doesn't prove that you have encrypted files. You could simply
>> say
>> that you installed it a long time ago just to see how it works, or
>> whatever.
>
> Ah, see, that'd be lying. I'm pretty sure I didn't have anything bad,
> and, quite frankly, if I *did*, I deserve to be punished. Simple as
> that.
Perhaps, but the way to state it is to invoke your right against self-
incrimination. That you do that - legally - is no basis to say you're
guilty of something.
Jim
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On Mon, 13 Oct 2008 11:36:03 -0600, somebody wrote:
> TrueCrypt sounds exactly like the type of program FBI would write and
> release, without disclosing the backdoor, of course.
Except that it's released under an open source license and all the code
is available for inspection.
Jim
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On Mon, 13 Oct 2008 13:20:26 -0400, Warp wrote:
> Of course there's little TrueCrypt can do about that.
Well, actually, it can - you just encrypt the entire disk. Of course,
then it's obvious you're using TrueCrypt (because it asks for a password
at boot time, at least from my read of the docs), but again you can do a
dual-partition setup where you have, say, a Windows install that you use
for innocuous things and a Linux install that you use for sensitive work.
Jim
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Not that it matters; either way, they took the computers and I've not heard
about them since. What they do with them if I never get them back is
irrelevant, likewise if I *do* get them back, what they do with them is
irrelevant.
--
Tim Cook
http://empyrean.freesitespace.net
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On Mon, 13 Oct 2008 16:01:08 -0400, Tim Cook wrote:
> Not that it matters; either way, they took the computers and I've not
> heard about them since.
Well, yeah, because you didn't encrypt the data, the point is kinda moot
for your specific situation.
> What they do with them if I never get them back
> is irrelevant, likewise if I *do* get them back, what they do with them
> is irrelevant.
Unless, of course, they find something they decide is prosecutable.
Jim
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Darren New wrote:
> Mueen Nawaz wrote:
>> Fifth Amendment only works if you're being investigated. If, however,
>> they're searching your computer for evidence about someone else's crime,
>> I don't think you can plead the Fifth.
>
> I am not a lawyer, but I believe this is not accurate. I remember
> someone's secretary pleading the fifth when asked about her boss' stuff
> and getting away with it.
>
> The trick is, they can't really pursue *why* you are pleading the fifth,
> if you follow the logic.
I don't know it with any less uncertainty as you. Yes, I know you could
do that, but of course the actual fifth amendment is to protect yourself
from incriminating yourself. The DA could offer immunity, and then you
have to comply.
>> In the US, however, I believe you
>> don't have to hand over the password regardless.
>
> Actually, the case is new enough that I didn't find any appeals that
> would make it actual precedent, so I suspect it's still up in the air.
It's happened once or twice in the US.
http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=07/12/15/1459243
Actually, that was a Fifth Amendment case. Maybe I was wrong...
This one's about the UK (although I've heard this a number of times
over the years):
http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=07/10/02/1237215
--
"I think not," said Descartes, and promptly disappeared.
/\ /\ /\ /
/ \/ \ u e e n / \/ a w a z
>>>>>>mue### [at] nawazorg<<<<<<
anl
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Warp wrote:
> I think that even from a moral point of view honesty does not require
> you to divulge everything you do just because you are asked. There is this
> thing called privacy, and people are entitled to it. What you want to hide
> might not be anything illegal, but it can still be embarrassing, and nobody
> should be forced to divulge anything they don't want to, not from a legal
> nor from a moral point of view.
>
> Sure, sometimes the right to privacy may be abused to hide illegal material
> (eg. child porn or terrorist plans), but I still don't think that privacy
> should be lifted from everybody simply because a few individuals abuse it
> to hide illegal material. Nobody should be forced to reveal encryption keys
> simply because they *might* be hiding something illegal. That's a very
> dangerous road which we don't want to follow.
I wish the law agreed with you. As it is, for people like me, getting
caught lying would put me in much more trouble (jail time) than losing
my privacy, or getting in trouble with anything I currently have to hide
(i.e. not much).
--
"I think not," said Descartes, and promptly disappeared.
/\ /\ /\ /
/ \/ \ u e e n / \/ a w a z
>>>>>>mue### [at] nawazorg<<<<<<
anl
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Warp wrote:
> That may give them a hint that you might have encrypted files in your
> system, but they have no way of knowing which ones they are. TrueCrypt
> itself leaves no history anywhere.
They will depending on how you use it. The command line way of doing
things is:
truecrypt /path/to/file
That path will show up in the history. Of course, perhaps that's poor
usage - but last time I checked, the docs didn't mention the potential
problem.
In any case, fine: Let's say he doesn't use the command line.
If he navigated to the directory where it was mounted recently, that'll
show up in the history, and may give clues to its content. This will
give them a strong indication that there is a TC volume somewhere, and
they could ask him about it.
>> Or they could look to see if you have truecrypt installed.
>
> Still doesn't prove that you have encrypted files. You could simply say
> that you installed it a long time ago just to see how it works, or whatever.
Won't work if you navigated into it recently (command history).
>> Or they could look to see if you have unmounted truecrypt directories.
>> I tried it and at least on my computer, truecrypt doesn't automatically
>> delete those directories.
>
> You can choose whatever directory names you want to mount a TrueCrypt
> file system. Just use /tmp/tmp/ or whatever. Nothing suspicious about that.
Will have to look into that - been a while. I *do* recall that
initially TC wasn't working as expected, and *did* leave stuff around in
/tmp. Perhaps nothing too important, other than showing that TC did
exist and was being used. It doesn't anymore (don't remember what the
problem was).
>> As for hidden partition, I don't know the details. I believe an
>> analysis was done and they only guaranteed true hiddenness if you used
>> FAT as the filesystem of the hidden partition. More precisely, it was
>> shown that if you use ext3, there will likely be data elsewhere on the
>> HD that will hint that there is a hidden partition somewhere.
>
> Then use FAT? What's the problem?
Not obvious to folks on Linux that they shouldn't use ext3 on a TC
volume. Last I checked, the docs didn't imply additional security if you
use FAT.
>> There are other analyses. Let's say you make your "outer" TC partition
>> 30 GB. And inside it you make your hidden partition 10 GB. I read
>> somewhere that TC makes that 10 GB block contiguous. So when you give
>> the password to your outer TC, if they look they'll see that your data
>> (if you have enough of it), will be all over that 30 GB except for this
>> big block of 10 GB which has random data (which, to the FS, appears to
>> be free space). Now you could say that you just deleted a 10 GB file,
>> explaining that big unused contiguous block, but...
>
> AFAIK TrueCrypt puts random garbage at every free block for the precise
> reason that it's impossible to tell whether it's just that, random garbage,
> or a hidden partition.
Yes, but I think you miss my point. Or I don't understand how things
are stored on the HD.
The area occupied by the hidden partition will have random stuff in
it, but will appear to be "free" space by the FS (as in space available
for writing). A contiguous block of 10 GB, especially with actual data
around it, will look suspicious. Regardless of whether that space has
random data.
It's as if you just deleted 10 GB worth of contiguous material.
Possible, but not likely.
Of course, they can't *prove* anything with what I'm saying. And if you
think you could get into real trouble, it is of course better to just
deny. However, there is a risk in lying, and if you really don't have
much to hide, that risk can be quite high (at least in the US - say when
you're crossing the border).
--
"I think not," said Descartes, and promptly disappeared.
/\ /\ /\ /
/ \/ \ u e e n / \/ a w a z
>>>>>>mue### [at] nawazorg<<<<<<
anl
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Warp wrote:
>> Also, if the investigators fill with true random bits the sections that you
>> have encrypted, before turning it over, can you sue them for lost data?
>
> But then, how do they know that they are overwriting encrypted data?
> They have no way of proving that a certain file is actually encrypted
> rather than containing some data used by some program.
>
> They might as well destroy all your files. Do they perform such a
> vandalism?
I guess he meant writing stuff onto space allocated as free. That will
destroy any hidden partitions.
--
"Auntie Em: Hate Kansas. Hate You. Took Dog. -Dorothy."
/\ /\ /\ /
/ \/ \ u e e n / \/ a w a z
>>>>>>mue### [at] nawazorg<<<<<<
anl
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Jim Henderson wrote:
> history -c is your friend....
Doesn't work on zsh.
--
"Auntie Em: Hate Kansas. Hate You. Took Dog. -Dorothy."
/\ /\ /\ /
/ \/ \ u e e n / \/ a w a z
>>>>>>mue### [at] nawazorg<<<<<<
anl
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On Mon, 13 Oct 2008 17:09:29 -0500, Mueen Nawaz wrote:
> Jim Henderson wrote:
>> history -c is your friend....
>
> Doesn't work on zsh.
One good reason not to use zsh, then. I've never used it, I tend towards
tcsh myself.
So you got me curious - so a few seconds in zsh and a look at the man
page and found the following: RCS is set, then the history file isn't
saved.....If it's unset, then the history file is saved.
You also have the option of wiping the .zsh_history file.
So even then there's an out, you just need to know the environment you're
working in well enough to protect yourself.
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Mueen Nawaz <m.n### [at] ieeeorg> wrote:
> Warp wrote:
> >> Also, if the investigators fill with true random bits the sections that you
> >> have encrypted, before turning it over, can you sue them for lost data?
> >
> > But then, how do they know that they are overwriting encrypted data?
> > They have no way of proving that a certain file is actually encrypted
> > rather than containing some data used by some program.
> >
> > They might as well destroy all your files. Do they perform such a
> > vandalism?
> I guess he meant writing stuff onto space allocated as free. That will
> destroy any hidden partitions.
They would have to decrypt the main partition first.
--
- Warp
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Mueen Nawaz <m.n### [at] ieeeorg> wrote:
> If he navigated to the directory where it was mounted recently, that'll
> show up in the history, and may give clues to its content. This will
> give them a strong indication that there is a TC volume somewhere, and
> they could ask him about it.
Just because you have navigated to a directory doesn't mean the directory
was a TrueCrypt mount. It could have been anything.
After you unmount from TrueCrypt you could execute a "rm -rf *" inside
that directory (so that that command is stored in your command history)
and simply say that you deleted all the files from there.
> >> Or they could look to see if you have truecrypt installed.
> >
> > Still doesn't prove that you have encrypted files. You could simply say
> > that you installed it a long time ago just to see how it works, or whatever.
> Won't work if you navigated into it recently (command history).
Starting TrueCrypt does not prove you have encrypted files. Besides,
command histories can be easily deleted, if you are so worried about them.
> > Then use FAT? What's the problem?
> Not obvious to folks on Linux that they shouldn't use ext3 on a TC
> volume. Last I checked, the docs didn't imply additional security if you
> use FAT.
Last I checked, the TrueCrypt documentation clearly stated why you should
use FAT as the file system, and why it is the default when nothing else is
specified.
> > AFAIK TrueCrypt puts random garbage at every free block for the precise
> > reason that it's impossible to tell whether it's just that, random garbage,
> > or a hidden partition.
> Yes, but I think you miss my point. Or I don't understand how things
> are stored on the HD.
> The area occupied by the hidden partition will have random stuff in
> it, but will appear to be "free" space by the FS (as in space available
> for writing). A contiguous block of 10 GB, especially with actual data
> around it, will look suspicious. Regardless of whether that space has
> random data.
What do you mean "actual data"? Of course all the sectors will have "data".
The ones which are free will have random garbage (or a hidden volume).
There's no way of telling if that data is just random gargabe or something
else.
> It's as if you just deleted 10 GB worth of contiguous material.
> Possible, but not likely.
How about you simply created the volume and added some files to it?
The rest of the volume will be unused.
> Of course, they can't *prove* anything with what I'm saying. And if you
> think you could get into real trouble, it is of course better to just
> deny. However, there is a risk in lying, and if you really don't have
> much to hide, that risk can be quite high (at least in the US - say when
> you're crossing the border).
Well, good luck for them to prove that you are indeed lying.
--
- Warp
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Mueen Nawaz wrote:
>> Actually, the case is new enough that I didn't find any appeals that
>> would make it actual precedent, so I suspect it's still up in the air.
>
> It's happened once or twice in the US.
>
> http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=07/12/15/1459243
That's the same US Magistrate Judge. That isn't a precedent.
Case law becomes precedent only *after* you appeal and win.
--
Darren New / San Diego, CA, USA (PST)
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"Warp" <war### [at] tagpovrayorg> wrote in message
news:48f38e44@news.povray.org...
> somebody <x### [at] ycom> wrote:
> Except that TrueCrypt is open source. That more or less ensures that it
> doesn't do anything behind the scenes.
Fair enough, didn't check that first. Although, OS alone does not of course
ensure anything in principle. There's much OS out there which I doubt more
than one person ever looked at the source. Depends on how many developers
are actually working on it. Also, the backdoor may not be visible in the
code. It's possible to develop a novel encryption scheme for which only you
know the weakness. It may take a while for others to discover the problem.
> > Also, if the investigators fill with true random bits the sections that
you
> > have encrypted, before turning it over, can you sue them for lost data?
> But then, how do they know that they are overwriting encrypted data?
They don't need to know. They can low level fill all unused sectors.
> They have no way of proving that a certain file is actually encrypted
> rather than containing some data used by some program.
Neither can you claim they wiped your data then.
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somebody wrote:
> Fair enough, didn't check that first. Although, OS alone does not of course
> ensure anything in principle. There's much OS out there which I doubt more
> than one person ever looked at the source. Depends on how many developers
It's a well known product. You might as well not trust gpg, pgp, or
anything else you don't code yourself.
> are actually working on it. Also, the backdoor may not be visible in the
> code. It's possible to develop a novel encryption scheme for which only you
> know the weakness. It may take a while for others to discover the problem.
They use, or at least offer, standard well known encryption schemes
(assuming you mean algorithms). Stick to those if you want to be safe.
>>> Also, if the investigators fill with true random bits the sections that
> you
>>> have encrypted, before turning it over, can you sue them for lost data?
>
>> But then, how do they know that they are overwriting encrypted data?
>
> They don't need to know. They can low level fill all unused sectors.
I'm not sure you get it.
I can create a file (call it outer) that is a container for my
encrypted stuff. Within it, I can create another hidden container.
The hidden container appears to be unused space only after you decrypt
the outer container.
If you don't decrypt outer, then the whole space outer appears as a
file - not as an unused sector. The idea is that if someone does not
know that the file outer is actually an encrypted container, then that
someone will not be able to figure it out. It looks just like any other
data file.
So unless they actually decrypt something first, the technique you
describe will only delete stuff that had already been deleted, so to
speak, and of little relevance to anyone.
--
DO NOT REMOVE THIS TAG (UNDER PENALTY OF LAW)
/\ /\ /\ /
/ \/ \ u e e n / \/ a w a z
>>>>>>mue### [at] nawazorg<<<<<<
anl
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Warp wrote:
> Just because you have navigated to a directory doesn't mean the directory
> was a TrueCrypt mount. It could have been anything.
You're looking at it from an inverted viewpoint. When they look at the
computer, they're not going to start with "Does he have a truecrypt
container?".
They'll likely browse your command history, and find something of
interest in a given directory. They navigate there to see it is empty.
Fine - let's say the person always did a rm -rf *. But they see you
repeatedly accessing stuff there time after time. It may raise eyebrows.
Not proof of anything, but perhaps enough to warrant a questioning.
> Last I checked, the TrueCrypt documentation clearly stated why you should
> use FAT as the file system, and why it is the default when nothing else is
> specified.
I don't see it in their online docs. They mention you can do NTFS and
FAT, but a quick glance did not show any discussion on what you should
use. And as the docs are quite geared towards Windows, one could get the
impression that it just has NTFS and FAT to target that audience. I
don't think they actually suggest anywhere *not* using any other FS.
(Edit: I just saw in the section about hidden containers that it says
not to use a journaling FS).
>> The area occupied by the hidden partition will have random stuff in
>> it, but will appear to be "free" space by the FS (as in space available
>> for writing). A contiguous block of 10 GB, especially with actual data
>> around it, will look suspicious. Regardless of whether that space has
>> random data.
>
> What do you mean "actual data"? Of course all the sectors will have "data".
> The ones which are free will have random garbage (or a hidden volume).
> There's no way of telling if that data is just random gargabe or something
> else.
See figure at http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hidden-volume.php
Let the total area be 30 GB, and the hidden container be 10 GB.
You start off with nothing in either. You just created it.
So you slowly add stuff to both, as time goes by.
If anyone were to decrypt the outer container, they'd see at least 10
GB (typically more) of unallocated space. It has random bits in it, but
the FS reports it as available.
The 10 GB used by the hidden container, if contiguous (which I suspect
it is), will always appear as a 10 GB contiguous block of free space
when you decrypt the outer container.
A 10 GB contiguous unallocated block in a 30 GB partition is not
expected to exist over a long period. It's expected that one writes a
lot, and deletes a lot, resulting in fragmentation. The remaining 20 GB
will appear fragmented, but that 10 GB will always appear available,
with the FS reporting no data there.
Sure, it will have random bits, but nevertheless, it will all be one
contiguous, unallocated block.
How much this matters depends on your usage. If you just keep 1 GB of
stuff in the outer container, then this may not look weird.
I may be stretching, but I don't think I'm wrong. You pick your level
of paranoia as a user. When it comes to those who design the software,
though, they have to assume worst case scenarios.
Perhaps I'm totally wrong. I don't see a flaw, though. The following
page gives some precautions:
http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hidden-volume-precautions.php
Frankly, the trouble I'd have to go through to follow all the advice on
that page is not worth it. I'm quite content at not trying to hide TC
(or any similar system) usage, and I'm more concerned about
non-law-enforcement accessing stuff on my HD (e.g. someone visiting my
house so that he cannot see financial records).
> Well, good luck for them to prove that you are indeed lying.
Interrogations can be surprisingly effective. Even the ones where they
don't do anything illegal.
--
DO NOT REMOVE THIS TAG (UNDER PENALTY OF LAW)
/\ /\ /\ /
/ \/ \ u e e n / \/ a w a z
>>>>>>mue### [at] nawazorg<<<<<<
anl
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Jim Henderson wrote:
> You also have the option of wiping the .zsh_history file.
True.
> So even then there's an out, you just need to know the environment you're
> working in well enough to protect yourself.
Yeah. Frankly, I don't yet have anything to warrant the inconvenience
of hiding TC (or any similar system) usage. But good to know the options
are there...
--
DO NOT REMOVE THIS TAG (UNDER PENALTY OF LAW)
/\ /\ /\ /
/ \/ \ u e e n / \/ a w a z
>>>>>>mue### [at] nawazorg<<<<<<
anl
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