In article <pan### [at] nospamcom>, 
nos### [at] nospamcom says...
> On Tue, 22 Aug 2006 15:35:04 -0700, Patrick Elliott wrote:
> 
> > Sigh. Lets put this in simple terms so you will understand it.
> 
> Likewise....and using your example.
> 
> > 1. Radicals make a bomb, and want on a plane.
> > 2. Radicals decide to dress in a suit, not a beard and turban (yeah I
 
> > know, they don't anyway. That's not the #$#@$@# point though).
> > 3. Security people have three choices:
> >   a. search all people
> >   b. just pick people at random and **hope**
> >   c. *try* to apply *some sort of filter* to who they look at.
> 
> > You admit (a) isn't practical
> 
> Right, and I think we're agreed on that point.
> 
> > insist (c) isn't appropriate if their 
> > skin color, name or place of origin is in any way somehow involved and
 
> > that 
> 
> Given your example, even if (c) were applied, your troublemaker got
> through - and maybe got through *easier* because he didn't fit the profil
e
> being used.  *THAT* is why using racial profiling is a problem.
> 
And I I keep saying, 100% random searches will neither stop someone 
willing to play the odds, nor increase the odds that you won't miss them 
anyway, especially if, ironically, the profile would have helped. Its a 
null argument, even if I accepted the premise that it really was 
something happening as wide spread, often or in the way that such an 
argument implies.

> The thing that you need to look at is the goal of the searching.  The goa
l
> of airport security screening procedures is not to catch the bad guys. 
> You heard me right - that is NOT the goal.  The goal is to provide a
> visible deterrant that everyone sees.  In order to be an effective
> deterrant, you absolutely *can not* apply a filter.  If you do that, the
> deterrant value goes out the window.
> 
Right. The whole, "it keeps the honest terrorists in line", argument. 
Kind of like the, "If you stick a sign on your window claiming to have 
an alarm, it will work just as well as really having one, since the 
'honest' crooks will take the sign at its word." The problem here is you 
are making a predicated, unfounded and potentially invalid assumption 
that it "is" a deterrent or will be for everyone trying it.

> Airport security screening is little more than a PR vehicle - it's what w
e
> do so we can say "we're doing something".  The actual security level is
> very, very low compared to what the average person who flies rarely (or
> even occasionally) believes it is and that TSA provides.
>
Gosh.. I guess all those people in the intelligence agency will be real 
happy to know they can stop finding out the aliases and real names of 
terrorists, since having that information is worthless anyway...
 
> I'm not saying get rid of it - I'm saying that the things that are done
> are mostly show, and while there are a few things that they will catch, b
y
> and large the real problem people are not going to be stopped there,
> they're stopped well before they get to the airport.
And, in either system, random or otherwise, we just cross our fingers 
and hope that the one real terrorist doesn't either ignore the deterrent 
and get through, or look like someone that doesn't fit some profile. 
Right. Got that!

> Non-random searches *might* fail to catch the ones as well.  The only
> solution to that is to search everyone.  If there's a *chance* you might
> miss someone and that's unacceptable, search everyone, then.  Tell people
> to show up 4-5 hours ahead of their flight and prepare to strip buck nake
d.
> 
See, now you are getting it. lol

-- 
void main () {

    call functional_code()
  else
    call crash_windows();
}

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Patrick Elliott wrote:
> In article <pan### [at] nospamcom>, 
> nos### [at] nospamcom says...
>> On Tue, 22 Aug 2006 15:35:04 -0700, Patrick Elliott wrote:
>>
>>> Sigh. Lets put this in simple terms so you will understand it.
>> Likewise....and using your example.
>>
>>> 1. Radicals make a bomb, and want on a plane.
>>> 2. Radicals decide to dress in a suit, not a beard and turban (yeah I 
>>> know, they don't anyway. That's not the #$#@$@# point though).
>>> 3. Security people have three choices:
>>>   a. search all people
>>>   b. just pick people at random and **hope**
>>>   c. *try* to apply *some sort of filter* to who they look at.
>>> You admit (a) isn't practical
>> Right, and I think we're agreed on that point.
>>
>>> insist (c) isn't appropriate if their 
>>> skin color, name or place of origin is in any way somehow involved and 
>>> that 
>> Given your example, even if (c) were applied, your troublemaker got
>> through - and maybe got through *easier* because he didn't fit the profile
>> being used.  *THAT* is why using racial profiling is a problem.
>>
> And I I keep saying, 100% random searches will neither stop someone 
> willing to play the odds, nor increase the odds that you won't miss them 
> anyway, especially if, ironically, the profile would have helped. Its a 
> null argument, even if I accepted the premise that it really was 
> something happening as wide spread, often or in the way that such an 
> argument implies.
> 
>> The thing that you need to look at is the goal of the searching.  The goal
>> of airport security screening procedures is not to catch the bad guys. 
>> You heard me right - that is NOT the goal.  The goal is to provide a
>> visible deterrant that everyone sees.  In order to be an effective
>> deterrant, you absolutely *can not* apply a filter.  If you do that, the
>> deterrant value goes out the window.
>>
> Right. The whole, "it keeps the honest terrorists in line", argument. 
> Kind of like the, "If you stick a sign on your window claiming to have 
> an alarm, it will work just as well as really having one, since the 
> 'honest' crooks will take the sign at its word." The problem here is you 
> are making a predicated, unfounded and potentially invalid assumption 
> that it "is" a deterrent or will be for everyone trying it.
> 
>> Airport security screening is little more than a PR vehicle - it's what we
>> do so we can say "we're doing something".  The actual security level is
>> very, very low compared to what the average person who flies rarely (or
>> even occasionally) believes it is and that TSA provides.
>>
> Gosh.. I guess all those people in the intelligence agency will be real 
> happy to know they can stop finding out the aliases and real names of 
> terrorists, since having that information is worthless anyway...
>  
>> I'm not saying get rid of it - I'm saying that the things that are done
>> are mostly show, and while there are a few things that they will catch, by
>> and large the real problem people are not going to be stopped there,
>> they're stopped well before they get to the airport.
> And, in either system, random or otherwise, we just cross our fingers 
> and hope that the one real terrorist doesn't either ignore the deterrent 
> and get through, or look like someone that doesn't fit some profile. 
> Right. Got that!
> 
>> Non-random searches *might* fail to catch the ones as well.  The only
>> solution to that is to search everyone.  If there's a *chance* you might
>> miss someone and that's unacceptable, search everyone, then.  Tell people
>> to show up 4-5 hours ahead of their flight and prepare to strip buck naked.
>>
> See, now you are getting it. lol
> 

This is the *real* WTF.

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