Patrick Elliott wrote:
> In article <pan### [at] nospamcom>, 
> nos### [at] nospamcom says...
>> On Tue, 22 Aug 2006 15:35:04 -0700, Patrick Elliott wrote:
>>
>>> Sigh. Lets put this in simple terms so you will understand it.
>> Likewise....and using your example.
>>
>>> 1. Radicals make a bomb, and want on a plane.
>>> 2. Radicals decide to dress in a suit, not a beard and turban (yeah I 
>>> know, they don't anyway. That's not the #$#@$@# point though).
>>> 3. Security people have three choices:
>>>   a. search all people
>>>   b. just pick people at random and **hope**
>>>   c. *try* to apply *some sort of filter* to who they look at.
>>> You admit (a) isn't practical
>> Right, and I think we're agreed on that point.
>>
>>> insist (c) isn't appropriate if their 
>>> skin color, name or place of origin is in any way somehow involved and 
>>> that 
>> Given your example, even if (c) were applied, your troublemaker got
>> through - and maybe got through *easier* because he didn't fit the profile
>> being used.  *THAT* is why using racial profiling is a problem.
>>
> And I I keep saying, 100% random searches will neither stop someone 
> willing to play the odds, nor increase the odds that you won't miss them 
> anyway, especially if, ironically, the profile would have helped. Its a 
> null argument, even if I accepted the premise that it really was 
> something happening as wide spread, often or in the way that such an 
> argument implies.
> 
>> The thing that you need to look at is the goal of the searching.  The goal
>> of airport security screening procedures is not to catch the bad guys. 
>> You heard me right - that is NOT the goal.  The goal is to provide a
>> visible deterrant that everyone sees.  In order to be an effective
>> deterrant, you absolutely *can not* apply a filter.  If you do that, the
>> deterrant value goes out the window.
>>
> Right. The whole, "it keeps the honest terrorists in line", argument. 
> Kind of like the, "If you stick a sign on your window claiming to have 
> an alarm, it will work just as well as really having one, since the 
> 'honest' crooks will take the sign at its word." The problem here is you 
> are making a predicated, unfounded and potentially invalid assumption 
> that it "is" a deterrent or will be for everyone trying it.
> 
>> Airport security screening is little more than a PR vehicle - it's what we
>> do so we can say "we're doing something".  The actual security level is
>> very, very low compared to what the average person who flies rarely (or
>> even occasionally) believes it is and that TSA provides.
>>
> Gosh.. I guess all those people in the intelligence agency will be real 
> happy to know they can stop finding out the aliases and real names of 
> terrorists, since having that information is worthless anyway...
>  
>> I'm not saying get rid of it - I'm saying that the things that are done
>> are mostly show, and while there are a few things that they will catch, by
>> and large the real problem people are not going to be stopped there,
>> they're stopped well before they get to the airport.
> And, in either system, random or otherwise, we just cross our fingers 
> and hope that the one real terrorist doesn't either ignore the deterrent 
> and get through, or look like someone that doesn't fit some profile. 
> Right. Got that!
> 
>> Non-random searches *might* fail to catch the ones as well.  The only
>> solution to that is to search everyone.  If there's a *chance* you might
>> miss someone and that's unacceptable, search everyone, then.  Tell people
>> to show up 4-5 hours ahead of their flight and prepare to strip buck naked.
>>
> See, now you are getting it. lol
> 

This is the *real* WTF.

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