Kevin Wampler wrote:
> There's a further rather critical assumption in the article that's not 

> explicitly stated: That the definition of "good" as it applies to God 
> coincides with the definition of "good" as it applies to human actions.


Sure. And that's once again the "it isn't really evil, because then God 
would be doing evil" justification.

In other words, that's exactly what
"""
the bulk of the discussion then becomes a matter of theists arguing that 

actually, the world’s pretty great, the evil things in it are per
fectly 
justified and necessary, and everything is for the best
"""
is addressing in a nice concise way.

> Of course this leaves open the issue of how we can coherently 
> claim that God is "good" without being able to define what "good" means
, 
> but I can't see how he addresses this point.

He addresses it throughout the article. "Torturing and killing people is 

good, by definition".

> Overall I was left with the distinct impression that he was arguing 
> against straw-man versions to the resolutions to the problem of evil. 

I dunno. It seems that every rebuttal to the problem is essentially eithe
r 
"you don't realize that the Holocaust was good and not evil" or "everyone
 
tortured to death during the Holocaust deserved it."  That's what he's 
addressing, and that's what you're arguing as well.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Darren New wrote:
> Kevin Wampler wrote:
>> There's a further rather critical assumption in the article that's not 
>> explicitly stated: That the definition of "good" as it applies to God 
>> coincides with the definition of "good" as it applies to human actions.
> 
> Sure. And that's once again the "it isn't really evil, because then God 
> would be doing evil" justification.
> 
> In other words, that's exactly what
> """
> the bulk of the discussion then becomes a matter of theists arguing that 
> actually, the world’s pretty great, the evil things in it are perfectly 
> justified and necessary, and everything is for the best
> """
> is addressing in a nice concise way.

While that is a valid interpretation of what he said in that sentence, I 
don't see that the rest of his arguments addressed what I'm talking 
about, since there's a subtle distinction that he seems to be completely 
ignoring (see my next paragraph).


>> Of course this leaves open the issue of how we can coherently claim 
>> that God is "good" without being able to define what "good" means, but 
>> I can't see how he addresses this point.
> 
> He addresses it throughout the article. "Torturing and killing people is 
> good, by definition".

Not at all, see point 1) in the next paragraph.


>> Overall I was left with the distinct impression that he was arguing 
>> against straw-man versions to the resolutions to the problem of evil. 
> 
> I dunno. It seems that every rebuttal to the problem is essentially 
> either "you don't realize that the Holocaust was good and not evil" or 
> "everyone tortured to death during the Holocaust deserved it."  That's 
> what he's addressing, and that's what you're arguing as well.
> 

It's actually not what I'm arguing here.  I'll address the differences 
in turn:


1) "You don't realize that the Holocaust was good and not evil":

I'm instead pointing out that he ignores the viewpoint that might be 
most simply summed up "while the Holocaust was evil, creating a universe 
in which the holocaust could/would happen isn't necessarily".  Now, you 
could certainly attempt to make an argument against this point, but I 
don't see him doing it.

I should note, however, that such a God does come across as 
(potentially/probably) being rather unconcerned with our sufferings, but 
he bases his "moral repugnance" argument on assuming that this tell us 
something about human morality, which is not necessarily the case.


2) "Everyone tortured to death during the Holocaust deserved it.":

I don't see how "deserving it" factors into the points I was making, but 
if you think I'm actually making this argument I'd be interested to hear 
more specifically why that is.  Certainly he bases his particular 
example of this on original sin, which is not at all relevant to the 
points I was making.  I was actually quite surprised when he brought 
this up original sin as the "unifying principle" behind all the 
arguments, since that just seems to be a totally unjustified assertion 
unless you restrict yourself to very particular sorts Christian 
viewpoints (this is part of why why I see him as constructing straw-men).


Basically, I'm arguing that there's a version of the "moves in 
mysterious ways" argument which his points don't apply to.

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"Darren New" <dne### [at] sanrrcom> wrote in message
news:4aef073a$1@news.povray.org...
somebody wrote:

>> In fact, even as an atheist, I don't think the argument from evil is a
>> particularly strong one. For evil is a sliding scale.

>So you're making exactly the argument of "well, the world doesn't really
>contain evil after all," which is exactly the phrasing I found interesting
>in the article.

I'm rather claiming that the world/universe contains neither good, nor evil.
All is in our minds.

>You're doing the Descartes bit here. "In order to know good, we must know
>evil first."  I think the fact that we *can* imagine things like Event
>Horizon means we have a pretty good idea of a sliding scale of evil. What
if
>the "bad smell objectors" imagined Event Horizon and our world too.
Wouldn't
>they conclude the evil isn't all that bad?

Good point. But does that we can imagine Event Horizon mean that we can
imagine anything and everything worse? Maybe the bad smell objectors can
imagine us but not Event Horizon. And yet, imagination may not be the key. I
can imagine an 824 billion light years tall man - or rather, I may think, or
claim, that I can imagine such a thing. You can very well doubt the
legitimacy of such imagination. I can similarly doubt that
bad-smell-objectors can legitimately imagine Even Horizon, let alone us.

It's also not a matter of outwitting the system. That I have a pet model of
the character of evil doesn't mean that I should give up the concept, and
more than figuring out how pheromones works prevents scientists from falling
in love. Introspection is not, in other words, sufficient to override one's
nature.

>> I would counter that what we perceive as evil are simply foul
>> smells.

>"bulk of the discussion then becomes a matter of theists arguing that
>actually, the world's pretty great, the evil things in it are perfectly
>justified and necessary,"

Necessity of evil is a theistic angle. I don't find evil necessary - that
would be like finding gravity necessary. Gravity is not necessary, it just
is. However, I find it pretty much necessary that there will be things that
sentient beings will find evil, for senses have to differentiate between
inputs.

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somebody wrote:
> I'm rather claiming that the world/universe contains neither good, nor evil.
> All is in our minds.

Well, yes. But then that's ignoring the premise of what you're arguing against.

> Good point. But does that we can imagine Event Horizon mean that we can
> imagine anything and everything worse? 

I think it's that because we can imagine something better, we know there's 
unnecessary evil. What benefit is encephalitis? Do you really think there's 
nothing bad in the world that you can't imagine the world being just as good 
if it were missing?  You don't think a world without polio and smallpox is 
better than a world with polio and smallpox?

> Necessity of evil is a theistic angle. 

Right. And the article I posted explained why that is, in a way I'd not 
heard it so elegantly put.

> However, I find it pretty much necessary that there will be things that
> sentient beings will find evil, for senses have to differentiate between
> inputs.

Sure. But that's not playing the game. :-) The game starts by assuming a 
benevolent omnipotent being interested in whether there is good and evil in 
the world. Simply disclaiming there is no such thing as evil is stepping 
outside the system, which doesn't work with faithful people.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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"Kevin Wampler" <wam### [at] uwashingtonedu> wrote in message
news:4aef81b4$1@news.povray.org...
> Darren New wrote:
> >> But there's an extra, assumed step:
> >> 1b) God is good.
> >
> > Well, it's not assumed by the article in the link. It's explicitly
> > stated. Obviously the same logic doesn't hold for Satan or Zeus, for
> > example.
>
>
> There's a further rather critical assumption in the article that's not
> explicitly stated: That the definition of "good" as it applies to God
> coincides with the definition of "good" as it applies to human actions.

Indeed, there's the epistemological issues. As a kid, many of us might have
thought being forced, and sometimes tricked, into eating broccoli was
torture, and hence an evil act. The understanding changes with access to
higher knowledge, a wider perspective. Who's to say that the gap in
understanding between god and man is less than that of a toddler and a grown
up?

That said, a religion with a god or gods whose concept of good and evil are
as alien to us as a toddler's is to a grown ups, won't be either comforting
or convincing. So in the end, religions necessarily are hazy themselves on
the concepts of good and evil.

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"Tim Cook" <z99### [at] gmailcom> wrote in message
news:4aef1842@news.povray.org...
> Captain Jack wrote:

> > A candle is brighter than nothing.
> > Nothing is brighter than the sun.
> > Therefore, a candle is brighter than the sun.

> I prefer the form:
> A ham sandwich is better than nothing.
> Nothing is better than eternal happiness.
> Therefore, a ham sandwich is better than eternal happiness.

Amphibology?

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Kevin Wampler wrote:
> 1) "You don't realize that the Holocaust was good and not evil":
> 
> I'm instead pointing out that he ignores the viewpoint that might be 
> most simply summed up "while the Holocaust was evil, creating a universe 
> in which the holocaust could/would happen isn't necessarily".  Now, you 
> could certainly attempt to make an argument against this point, but I 
> don't see him doing it.

"the evil things in it are perfectly justified and necessary,"

You're saying "maybe the world would be more evil without the holocaust, you 
just can't tell."  That's *exactly* the argument he's talking about.

> 2) "Everyone tortured to death during the Holocaust deserved it.":
> 
> I don't see how "deserving it" factors into the points I was making, but 
> if you think I'm actually making this argument I'd be interested to hear 
> more specifically why that is. 

No, I was saying that he's saying that's the other usual argument. Either 
God causes the holocaust because preventing it would be more evil, or the 
holocaust happened because of Free Will, meaning that the evil came because 
you wanted it. Factor in some Original Sin there.

> Basically, I'm arguing that there's a version of the "moves in 
> mysterious ways" argument which his points don't apply to.

"the evil things in it are perfectly justified and necessary, and everything 
is for the best"

What mysterious ways are you talking about? That maybe God's idea of good 
doesn't match ours? Then he'd do evil by our definitions. That's saying that 
polio is actually good, and we just don't realize it, and the reason it's 
good is because God does it and God is by definition good.  Otherwise, I'm 
not seeing what you're trying to say. Maybe I'm just dense today.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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somebody wrote:
> Indeed, there's the epistemological issues. As a kid, many of us might have
> thought being forced, and sometimes tricked, into eating broccoli was
> torture, and hence an evil act. 

I think that this is a bogus argument, basically because it's trivial to 
imagine a world where all the things that taste good are the ones that are 
good for you. Being forced to eat broccoli seems like evil because it *is* 
evil - it's bad that healthy stuff tastes awful. Indeed, it's bad that there 
even is such a thing as unhealthy food.

This is the "it's good for you to suffer" argument, which is a subset of the 
"it isn't really evil after all" argument that I found clearly described.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Kevin Wampler wrote:
> I'm instead pointing out that he ignores the viewpoint that might be 
> most simply summed up "while the Holocaust was evil, creating a universe 
> in which the holocaust could/would happen isn't necessarily".  Now, you 
> could certainly attempt to make an argument against this point, but I 
> don't see him doing it.

Oh, I see what you mean.  I'll have to think about this more.  It's kind of 
late here. :-)

> Basically, I'm arguing that there's a version of the "moves in 
> mysterious ways" argument which his points don't apply to.

Yes, I grok now, after rereading a few times.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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Darren New wrote:
> You're saying "maybe the world would be more evil without the holocaust, 
> you just can't tell."  That's *exactly* the argument he's talking about.
> 
> ...
> 
> "the evil things in it are perfectly justified and necessary, and 
> everything is for the best"
> 
> What mysterious ways are you talking about? That maybe God's idea of 
> good doesn't match ours? Then he'd do evil by our definitions. That's 
> saying that polio is actually good, and we just don't realize it

NOTE: just saw your other response, but I'd already gone and typed this 
all out so I may as well post it.  If what you'd groked from my posts 
contradicts what I've written below I'd certainly be interested in 
hearing the argument that you thought I was making (maybe it's a better 
argument!)

---

I think this is what he doesn't address properly.  What he musters is this:

"Of course, one of the consequences of this is then that we are also too 
cognitively limited to understand what’s right and wrong"

This, unfortunately, doesn't follow from the point I'm making.  What 
would follow is that we're too cognitively limited to understand what's 
right and wrong for *God*, but it's perfectly consistent to believe that 
doesn't at all preclude us from understand what's right and wrong for 
humans.

Now, I realize that this may come across as "well maybe God wanted us to 
get polio", but that's not the view I'm talking about.  Rather it's the 
view that God's decisions would be made at a scale so much larger than 
ours that there might well be reasons (possibly beyond our 
comprehension) which make a universe which allows such things a "good" 
thing.  One might even say this would be expected considering the 
immeasurably vast scale on which God would be making decisions.

What this particular line of reasoning *would* entail, however, is that 
the concept of good as it applies to God sure doesn't seem to involve 
minimizing our earthly suffering as it's primary factor -- but I don't 
see how this is inconsistent or how it diminishes/undermines moral 
choice as we typically understand it on our human level (the latter of 
which seems to be his overall point).


> Otherwise, I'm not seeing what you're trying to say. Maybe I'm 
> just dense today.

I suppose I'd say that my point is that one could take the view that our 
earthly suffering simply isn't the primary factor in the decisions made 
by God, and that this doesn't preclude that there may be many ways in 
which such a God could be "good".

His argument, on the other hand, seems to be implicitly using the 
assumption that God is chose how to make the universe with the reduction 
of earthly human suffering as the primary moral factor.  This makes 
perfect sense in rebutting certain religious arguments, but he phrases 
his initial problem more generally than that, and I don't his reasoning 
carries over to the viewpoint I mention.

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