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clipka wrote:
> "An initial state (time t=0) is selected by assigning a state for each
> cell."
>
> (Wikipedia)
>
> Isn't that plain enough? You assign a state for /each/ cell. CA's don't
> seem to make any limitations on this.
Well, from that same page:
"""
It is usually assumed that every cell in the universe starts in the same
state, except for a finite number of cells in other states, often called a
configuration. More generally, it is sometimes assumed that the universe
starts out covered with a periodic pattern, and only a finite number of
cells violate that pattern. The latter assumption is common in
one-dimensional cellular automata.
"""
So you "generally" don't start with an infinite aperiodic pattern.
What I was really interested in was a proof that starting with a periodic
pattern (except a finite number of cells) didn't give more computing power
to the CA than starting with a single state (except a finite number of
cells). Because Wolfram is arguing about the computational power of Rule 110.
> Just name /any/ rule for that pattern
I don't think that works, because then it lets the CA calculate stuff a TM
cannot, and I think that would lead to a trivial disproof of the
Church-Turing thesis.
Now, a pattern that differs from a regular repeating pattern in only a
finite number of places? Sure, that's likely good.
But if Wikipedia says a repeating pattern for linear CAs is common, I'll
assume that's sufficient to quell my disquiet with the Rule 110 proof in
that regard. I'd still like to see a proof that having the repeating pattern
doesn't add computational power, which is what the Crawley paper was
apparently discussing. I'll have to take time to look at that closer.
--
Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
Serving Suggestion:
"Don't serve this any more. It's awful."
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