Warp wrote:
>   Mass and energy is quantized, and thus there's only a finite number of
> ways the balls can act. It doesn't matter how many possibilities there are,
> they are still finite.

I'm not sure that position is quantitized. But even granted that, the number 
of combinations is large enough that the possible sets of results are that 
you can't tell after 15 collisions where any balls on the table are.

>   Of course if we start measuring their physical properties at atomic
> accuracy, we may end up having random variation due to quantum phenomena,

That's what I was talking about, yes.  I was just pointing out that quantum 
randomness does indeed multiply into macroscopic results surprisingly 
quickly.  You don't need to do anything clever to make quantum effects 
overwhelm deterministic effects, just like you don't need to do anything 
highly magical and technical to witness quantum effects first hand - a few 
pairs of polarized sunglasses will do the trick.

> but that's exactly what I was saying in my original post.

Yes. You just had something like "(I'm not sure how often this happens)" or 
something that I was addressing with the billiards comment.

>   I define it that way because I don't consider events which are simply a
> consequence of deterministic and random events to be "making a choice".
> They are consequences, not choices.

Then I think you've trivially answered your question by making it impossible 
to determine the answer of whether or not we have free choice.

>> I think the first problem comes from defining "free will" as being able to 
>> make a choice that's neither deterministic nor random. (I'd say "not 
>> deterministic but controllable" or something, perhaps.) This is a "mu" kind 
>> of question, because you haven't said what it means to make a choice.
> 
>   What do you mean? Of course I did, and in a rather simple way at that:
> Making a choice is changing a deterministic chain of events in a non-random
> way.

But we've already determined that deterministic chains of events don't 
exist. And given that they're random, how would you know if you've changed them?

Doesn't *feeling* like you've made a choice come into the definition?

>   In other words, a deterministic chain of events is affected, broken,
> changed, resulting in a completely new chain of events which wouldn't have
> happened if this choice hadn't been made, but this change was not due to
> quantum (or any other unpredictable) randomness, but rather because of the
> will of a sentient, intelligent being.

ANd here you're defining "will" as "non-deterministic". You're saying "the 
series of events was affected by the will of a being in a way that is 
supernatural", then asking "can this be the case?"  How would you answer 
that? You're saying "can the chain of events be changed in a way that's 
impossible to detect with physcics?"  Well, that's impossible to detect.

> This choice was not simply a
> consequence of earlier events or quantum randomness. In other words, a
> sentient being is not completely bound by the laws of physics, but can
> affect outcomes in ways which are not determined by these laws.

And that's why you've defined the question to be unanswerable. "Do we have 
the ability to do things that are impossible to understand?" Um... :-)

>   Free choice is what would make sentient beings different from inanimate
> objects. If we are completely bound to physics, then we are, at its core,
> just inanimate objects with no true free will. Everything we do is just a
> direct consequence of past events and quantum randomness. The chains of
> events may be really, really complicated, but nevertheless just physical
> consequences, not choices.

If we're not bound to physics, then how do our choices affect the world?

I mean, you're saying "how can we do something that's neither 100% 
predictable, nor has unpredictable variations?" You've kind of eliminated 
the entire realm of possibility, as far as I can see. Especially since 
"choice" is unpredictable.

If you could predict it, it wouldn't be choice. If you couldn't predict it, 
it's by definition random. However, there's a third possibility, which is 
unpredictable determinism, which is indistinguishable from unpredictable 
randomness by definition.

>   I find it a rather odd definition. "If the consequences are too complicated
> to be predicted by us, then it's free will acting there."

More like "if even we can't predict what our own choice would be in advance, 
then it's a free choice." The only way it would not be free is if the choice 
is limited enough that we can predict it.

Indeed, that's even the layman kind of definition. If someone holds a gun up 
to your head and demands your wallet, we don't say you gave the robber your 
wallet of your own free choice. Why? Because we (and in particular the 
robber) can predict your behavior with a high degree of accuracy.

>   That means that what constitutes free will would change over time, as our
> ability to predict physical events gets increased.

Assuming there isn't irreducable quantum randomness involved, yes. If I 
could write down in an envelope whatever you were going to say or do 
tomorrow, and reliably and repeatedly to your satisfaction predict a day in 
advance every "free" choice you made, would you think you still have free will?

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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