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andrel wrote:
> Because that is what everybody does, even you.
Yes. That doesn't mean it *is* knowledge, and that doesn't mean everything
is reasonably "knowledge" to someone. That's why I'm bringing up the
examples of Napoleon.
>> No, I said knowledge is justified true belief.
>
> Again that implies that you or somebody knows what is 'true'.
No it doesn't. It merely means there are some assertions of belief which we
cannot determine the truth of, and hence we cannot determine whether they
are actually knowledge.
> I keep
> repeating that there are many differences of opinion about what is true,
> about what processes are allowed to determine if something is true and
> all the other metalevels.
Right. And I keep repeating that while there are many differences of
opinion, there are also many facts about which there are few differences of
opinion.
>>> In particular I am not allowed to say that I know no god exist nor
>>> would the pope be allowed to say that he knows God does exist.
>>
>> He (or you) could *say* it. That doesn't mean he's right. Assuming
>> we're still arguing over whether or not God actually exists, then it's
>> a question of whether it's (a) true and (b) justified to say it's true.
>>
>> Distinguish "I know God exists" from "I know I am Napoleon." What's
>> the difference between these two claims? Do you see any difference
>> between these two claims? If not, why use that word when it's equally
>> true to claim "I am confident God exists" or "I am confident I am
>> Napoleon"?
>
> Because nobody would say such a thing.
Sure they would. I am confident God doesn't exist. See? :-)
> Technically correct, but it would
> raise eyebrows if used in ordinary conversation. 'I am confident this is
> my daughter', 'No sir he could not have killed him, I am confident he
> was home last night'.
>> > In my opinion
>>> you can only do that if you have an objective reference frame that
>>> allows you to distinguish claims in a fields of belief versus those
>>> where truths that may be absolute.
>>
>> Now you've made "knowledge" objective, which I think you were
>> objecting to.
>
> Yes I was following your reasoning here, trying to point out leads to a
> nonsense conclusion. I am confident that in e.g. Greek I would have used
> another time than you did read.
But I didn't say we could distinguish confidently between whether something
that is disputed is knowledge and something that is disputed is not knowledge.
>> No, because he has justification and it is true.
>
> No, he merely thinks it is true, he may be wrong, so he has to use
> 'believe' according to your rules.
I'm not making rules. I'm simply saying that if he says he knows something,
and that thing is false, then he's mistaken. I'm not saying he isn't confident.
>> Simple question: Can you "know" something that's objectively
>> real-world false?
> yes. I know Newton's law of gravity.
You know what it is, but you also know it doesn't apply in all situations.
And that's true of every other replaced theory, and possible of every other
scientific theory.
> I also know that most cardiologists know what causes the T wave part of
> the ECG. I also know that they are wrong.
You see, I would never say that. I would say "They think they know what
causes it, but I know they're wrong", or even "I think they're wrong".
OK, so to you, there's no difference between knowing something and being
confident it's true. I feel that's a loss.
--
Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
"We'd like you to back-port all the changes in 2.0
back to version 1.0."
"We've done that already. We call it 2.0."
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