Warp wrote:
>   I cannot see any other possible definition of "free choice" than something
> which transcends the physical world, in other words, something which can
> break determinism in a non-random way, which basically breaks physics.

Well, it's a good definition. The primary problem is that you've defined the 
term in such a way as to be unknowable. I.e., it's a definition that 
prevents you from determining the answer to any of the questions you might 
ask about it.

Unfortunately, I think most definitions of "free choice" where you might ask 
"do we have it" are going to either be by definition unanswerable or by 
definition trivial. If you define "free choice" as "how humans make 
choices", then yes, obviously we have it and nothing else does. If you 
define "free choice" as "able to do anything conceivable" then obviously we 
don't have that, or we'd be flapping our arms to fly to the moon.

Another possible definition would be "a selection made by a system from one 
of multiple behaviors, where the selection of behavior is based on existing 
circumstances, and the selection of which behavior before the selection is 
made is impossible to predict by any system including the system making the 
selection."  I.e., it's free will if it's impossible to know what you're 
going to pick before you pick it, even for you. At that point, does it 
matter whether it's natural or supernatural?

In that definition, yes, we almost undoubtedly have free will, unless we're 
all Sims or something, and there's someone "outside" who can predict what 
we'll do by examining the state of the universe.

>   If we take the materialistic view (which, note, I'm not saying is wrong!)
> that the human mind is purely physical and doesn't transcend the laws of
> physics, I can see no other conclusion than that free choice does not exist,
> but every "choice" is just a consequence of something else (which is mostly
> a combination of both determinism and pure randomness). Of course these are
> not choices at all, just consequences.

Sure. But you see what you're doing? You're defining "free choice" as 
something supernatural, then saying "if there's nothing supernatural, 
there's no free choice."  You have basically trivialized your conclusion by 
presupposing the mechanism by which free choice comes about, then asked what 
happens if that mechanism isn't the basis of free choice.

I'd prefer to approach the subject by saying "Of course we have free choice. 
It's unprovable, but we also know we have self-awareness, which can't be 
proven to anyone else. But what is this free will that we have?"  I.e., I 
prefer to approach the topic by defining free will in a way that doesn't 
address the mechanism, then ask if there are mechanisms that would cause 
that to come about.

>   No, your "choices" are simply consequences of previous events and sometimes
> randomness. At its core, you are not different from an inanimate object which
> gets moved by physical phenomena. The object is not "choosing" anything.

That's like saying I didn't choose to make a fist, because that's just 
muscles contracting from electrical signals from my brain. You're mixing 
levels here. You're looking at choice as something that happens at the 
atomic level, and it's (probably) caused by some higher-level combination of 
things.  ("Probably" in the sense that maybe it is supernatural after all.)

I.e., something without self-awareness can't make a choice, right? Yet no 
atoms of your brain "think". No neuron of your brain "thinks." It's the sum 
total of the neurons in your brain which "think." To say "I can't think 
because none of my atoms think" is like saying "I can't make a choice 
because all of my atoms are deterministic."

I.e., "choice" is a pattern of thought, not a fundamental property of the 
universe. You *know* you're making choices. You're looking for the mechanism 
whereby those choice are made. You're defining that mechanism as something 
supernatural, then asking "if there's nothing supernatural about it, why 
does it feel like I'm making choices?"  If you weren't making choices, you 
wouldn't be asking the question in the first place.  Nobody asks "Is doing 
bluflert a result of determinism or randomness" because nobody is doing 
bluflert.

>>> Not at the most basic level. It's just a result of deterministic
>>> cause and effect and completely random unpredictable quantum fluctuations.
> 
>> Does a rock stop existing simply because its fall is a result of 
>> determinsitic gravity effects?
> 
>   Who said anyting about existence? I was talking about free choice.

It was an analogy. We *are* talking about definitions. :-)

A rock doesn't exist anyway. It's just a bunch of individual atoms 
interacting. We just *call* it a rock.  The concept of "rock" is in your 
head, not out there. :-)

>   If the human mind is bound to the exact same physics as the rock, then
> the human mind is no different from the rock. It's not really a sentient,
> independent being, but an inanimate object. Extremely complex, yes, but at
> its core no different from the rock.

It's a sentient independent being, *and* an object. (Not inanimate, 
technically, because that word means "doesn't move", but I know what you mean.)

No, humans are animate sentient independent beings made out of inanimate 
objects.

(Oh, and it's not the human "mind" as such, but the human brain, that's just 
an object. I expect the human "mind" is the pattern encoded in the brain. 
Still subject to the same physics, but in a different way than the rock is. 
For example, the human mind can completely disappear without a trace, while 
the brain or the rock cannot.)

> If it happened as a consequence, it's not a choice.

By your definition, *perhaps*. I think it's possible to have free will *and* 
be deterministic, because I don't equate free will with the supernatural. I 
equate it with a type of processing that goes on inside sufficiently 
intelligent minds.

Is it possible to be deterministic and intelligent? If so, what part of 
intelligence is involved in free choice?

Is it possible to be self-aware and deterministic? Is there any reason to 
believe you can't be self-aware and deterministic? That it would be 
impossible to (say) write a computer program that would learn enough to 
eventually understand its own workings and understand itself, becoming 
self-aware?


[ I recently wrote a long screed on the question of "what is consciousness" 
which I'll likely have a chance to organize later this week. It'll be fun 
incorporating some of this stuff too. Then I'll let y'all rip up my 
assumptions and bad logic here. ;-]
-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   I ordered stamps from Zazzle that read "Place Stamp Here".

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