clipka wrote:
> None yet that I ever heard of; doesn't necessarily mean that it's impossible
> though; even if it was, an acceptable trade-off might still exist.

I would think that a voting machine that prints out on paper a barcode with 
the voted candidates along with human-readable text would be sufficient and 
would give all the benefits of a normal fully-electronic device. Even if you 
took the count off the device's memory, if you had a human-readable record 
of what the machine was supposed to have counted in the case of a recount, 
that the voter could look at before walking away, you'd solve 90% of the 
problems. If you want a recount, recount the barcodes. If you don't trust 
the barcodes, go through the trouble of manually translating what they say 
and comparing it against the text. I'm not sure why so many people object to 
that system other than those who want to be able to fix the elections.

> For example, I know of a protocol that allow for "documents" (like an
> "electronic ballot" for example) to be digitally signed without their contents
> being disclosed to the signer (through an envelope so to speak). In case you
> are curious, I can dig up the details. There are quite some amazing things you
> can do with cryptography (and quite some amazing ways to foul up or work around

Yeah, but nothing the voter could check personally before walking away.

-- 
   Darren New, San Diego CA, USA (PST)
   My fortune cookie said, "You will soon be
   unable to read this, even at arm's length."

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