somebody wrote:
>> Except for two things: all the equations are actually pretty simple,
>> none of them seem to change.
> 
> Simplicity is in the eye of the beholder.

While that's true, it's also irrelevant. You *can* compare various 
mathematical formalisms for simplicity. That there seem to be only four 
non-integer magic constants in the entire universe would seem to 
indicate there might be something simpler than expected going on.

>> It's not really the case you can represent *anything* with mathematics.
>> You cannot represent God (pretty much by definition of God), and you
> 
> That's because "god(s)" are not anythings. 

How do you know?

> When one shows that they/he/she/it is, there's no reason why you won't be able to
model
> they/he/she/it.

How do you know?

I mean, really. First you say "I don't know what it is." Then in the 
very next sentence, you assert properties of it.

>> cannot represent a partially-inconsistent system (one that is
>> inconsistent sometimes but not other times,
> 
> Then you incorporate time into your equations/model.

Um, no. I mean "inconsistent" in the mathematical sense.

Every once in a while, God comes along and changes the rules so that 
nothing makes sense there for a while. Sort of "Tower of Babel" only for 
physical laws. I don't think you're going to find a mathematical formula 
that models that well enough to predict God's whims.

>> or in some places but not
>> other places).
> 
> Then you incorporate places into your equations/model.

Ibid.

>> Just as a couple of offhand examples.
> 
> Isotropy/homegeneity of space/time has nothing to do with whether
> representation is possible. 

No, it's the inconsistency I'm speaking of. That's what has to do with 
representation.

> Since observation can be thought of as a
> representation, anything observable automatically has one representation at
> least.

But that representation might not follow any sort of mathematical model. 
For example, there's no known mathematical model to indicate where a 
specific electron is, and indeed if I understand correctly, experiments 
show there cannot be one.

I strongly suspect there's no possible mathematical model for "free 
will" in its usual meaning.

Experiments with gravity show the best theory we have for it is 
incompatible with the best theory we have for atomic interactions. What 
happens when someone proves that gravity is incompatible with quantum 
mechanics? That there cannot be a GUT?

> Whether that model can be simplified, and can have predictive powers
> or not is the question, 

If it doesn't have predictive powers, it's not an appropriate model. 
It's merely a summary of the past rather than a model of the actual reality.

> A reality that can
> not be expressed with a simplified model, would, in essence, be random in
> *all* aspects

Nah. Your model would just be *wrong*.

> (again, redundancy leads to prediction). 

Only redundancy of cause and effect.

> I cannot imagine how
> intelligence of any sort can arise in such a reality.

That's kind of what I was saying. It's hard to imagine that sort of 
reality.

-- 
   Darren New / San Diego, CA, USA (PST)
     "That's pretty. Where's that?"
          "It's the Age of Channelwood."
     "We should go there on vacation some time."

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